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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters in the area of applied microeconomics. Using
a variety of quasi-experimental research designs, they study the labor market effects of a
wage subsidy in a highly informal economy, the impact of a tax-breaks program on small
formal firms’ entrance decision and the probability of survival, and the impact of exposure
to neighborhood crime on school absenteeism, respectively.
The first chapter studies the labor market effects of a wage subsidy introduced in Colom-
bia’s First Job Act. It exploits changes in the labor earnings distribution to measure how
the policy change affected net employment, the relative sizes of the formal and informal
labor markets, and the subsidy’s excess burden. The results indicate the policy caused siz-
able shifts of workers across the formal and informal labor markets, but relatively little net
employment growth. The policy’s marginal excess burden ranges from 0.1% to 4% of cor-
porate income tax revenues, which the paper argues represent a lower bound for what the
benefits of moving workers across sectors should be, for the policy to be welfare enhancing.
The second chapter, coauthored with Julio Romero, studies how taxes affect small
formal firms’ entrance decision, the probability of survival, employment and average per-
worker compensation. It exploits variation in tax treatment from a cohort-based, tax breaks
program implemented in Colombia in 2010. Exploiting the fact that to qualify firms must
have registered after December 31, 2010, it compares firms created soon before the cut-off
date, to firms created soon after. It finds the availability of the tax breaks did not affect
any of the outcomes considered.
The third chapter, coauthored with Amy Ellen Schwartz, studies whether exposure
to neighborhood violence causes school absenteeism. Exploiting variation in the timing of
violent crimes, it compares absenteeism days immediately after exposure, to days immedi-
ately before. It finds an increase in average absenteeism after exposure of 5% to 10%. The
response is statistically significant for both genders, most race/ethnic groups, and grade
levels, and varies by violent crime type, being stronger for cases of exposure to homicides.
Students exposed multiple times respond strongly to a second event, regardless of the vio-
lent crime type, but not to the subsequent ones.
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Chapter 1
Wage Subsidies in Labor Markets
with High Informality: Evidence from
Colombia’s First Job Act
1.1 Introduction
Wage subsidies are a widely used policy tool aimed at putting to work people with poor
employment prospects. A critical question is whether they succeed in creating new jobs,
or increase employment of eligible workers at the expense of non-eligible ones. The effec-
tiveness and efficiency of a wage subsidy largely depends on the answer to this question;
however, credibly identified evidence on the extent of workers’ displacement is relatively
scarce.1
1Katz (1996) assesses evidence on workers’ displacement as either inconclusive or non-credible, based
on studies of wage subsidy programs in the United States and other OECD countries. Kluve (2016) re-
marks workers’ displacement is the aspect of wage subsidies which we known the least about. Three stud-
ies that look explicitly at displacement effects are Crepon et al. (2013), Gautier et al. (2014) and Martins
and e Costa (2014). They address the question in the context of job search assistance programs. The
first two use field experiments carefully design to answer the question, and find evidence of displacement
effects, while the latter exploits discontinuities in program rules, and finds no evidence of displacement.
1
In developing economies, where a substantial portion of the labor market operates in-
formally, workers move across sectors too, making more uncertain the subsidy’s potential
net employment effect. Even if the policy objective is putting people to work in the formal
sector, it does not preclude the possibility of displacing non-eligible workers, or subsidizing
wages of individuals who would have had a formal job anyway.
This paper investigates how a wage subsidy introduced in Colombia’s First Job Act af-
fected the labor market. It allows formal firms to rebate in the form of tax credits from
the corporate income tax, 11.0 percentage points of payroll taxes paid on newly hired
workers either younger than 28 years old, or with labor earnings between one and one and
a half minimum wages. By introducing discontinuous changes in the marginal payroll tax
rate, the subsidy creates a strong incentive for formal firms to locate their newly hired em-
ployees in the ‘correct’ part of the distribution. If only job creation occurs, mass must in-
crease in the parts of the formal sector labor earnings and/or age distributions where the
subsidy applies, and no change anywhere else. If displacement of non-eligible formal work-
ers takes place, mass must drop in areas adjacent to the targeted one; if informal workers
shift sector to take subsidized jobs, they should come from an area similar to the affected
one in the formal sector distributions. The presence and extent of mass changes is tested
using individual level data on sector, and labor earnings and age from the Colombia’s Con-
tinuous Household Survey, a cross-sectional study representative for the entire labor mar-
ket.
I estimate the empirical formal and informal sector labor earnings and age distribu-
tions using Kernel methods. Contrasting them before and after the program started shows
mass increases in the formal sector in the earnings’ range where the subsidy applies, and
drops in areas neighboring it. In the informal sector mass drops around the minimum
wage, and increases around one and a half minimum wages. Meanwhile, there is no sign of
firms responding on the age margin. In addition to showing firms responded to the policy,
this simple exercise reveals ignoring or assuming away displacement of non-eligible work-
ers, draw an incomplete picture of the subsidy’s impact on the labor market.
2
Next, I exploit mass changes to assess the subsidy’s impact on employment. In the ab-
sence of distortions, excess mass in the formal sector distribution gives total employment
growth. Missing mass in areas adjacent to the targeted one, permit to account for within
formal sector displacement of workers, and in a similar manner, mass changes in the in-
formal sector for displacement between sectors. To estimate mass changes I bootstrapped
the following procedure. I reestimate the empirical distribution for the pre-subsidy period,
this time fitting a flexible polynomial, and use the parameters to predict the number of
workers per earnings level in the post-policy period. The difference between observed and
predicted number of workers gives the mass change. I find an 8% increase in employment
in the part of the distribution targeted by the policy. Former informal workers took 75%
of these jobs, the formal sector displaced workers 15%, and job seekers the remaining 10%.
Unless there are welfare gains from inducing the shift of workers across sectors and
earnings levels, the subsidy’s excess burden must be substantial. I derive a deadweight
loss formula from a static, general equilibrium model that allows for labor market’s seg-
mentation, heterogeneity in workers ability and firm’s productivity, and introduces a wage
subsidy that only covers the formal labor market. The formula is a function of the change
in the probability of holding a formal job, and the slope of the labor demand curve. I re-
cover the latter from the subsidy’s effect on employment, and use a difference-in-difference
strategy, where parts of the distribution unaffected by the subsidy control for economy-
wide trends and contemporaneous shocks, to estimate the change in the probability of
working formally. Computation of the formula shows the subsidy’s marginal excess burden
ranges from 0.1% to 4.0% of corporate tax revenues, or, in per-capita terms, from U$30 to
U$2,000 (PPP).
Attributes of formal jobs such as safer working conditions, access to health insurance
and to a retirement pension could render social benefits if, for example, they improve work-
ers health, productivity and lifetime consumption. Although estimating the benefits of for-
mality is out of the scope of this study, the deadweight loss calculation indirectly informs
it since it serves as a lower bound for what the benefits should be for the subsidy to be
3
welfare enhancing.
The results indicate the subsidy caused sizable shifts across the formal and informal
labor markets, and to a lesser extent across earnings levels, but relatively little net em-
ployment growth. Therefore, this study suggests more attention must be given to general
equilibrium effects when subsidizing wages, and to the welfare implications they might
have. If the primary policy objective was creating new jobs, the program is ineffective and
highly inefficient. Nonetheless, if the objective was creating formal jobs, the effectiveness
assessment might turn positive, and its efficiency will depend on whether external benefits
accrue from shifting workers across sectors, and if so, the extent of them.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. The next section de-
scribes the wage subsidy program, firm’s expected response, and data used in the empir-
ical analyses. Section 1.3 shows firms in fact responded, estimates the policy net impact
on employment, and the changes it induced in the relative sizes of the formal and infor-
mal labor markets. Section 1.4 estimates the policy’s marginal excess burden, Section 1.5
discusses the results, and Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Institutional Setting, Conceptual Framework and
Data
1.2.1 Colombia’s First Job Act
In December 2010, Colombia’s Congress passed Law 1429, also known as the First Job
Act. It introduced a tax credit equivalent to 11.0 percentage points of payroll taxes paid
on newly hired workers. The credit can be claimed for two consecutive fiscal years, as long
as newly hired workers: i) increase the number of employees on payroll, and the firm’s
wage bill; and ii) if male, are younger than 28 years old, if female, are younger than 28 or
older than 40 years old, or earn between one and one and a half minimum wages.
In addition to the section containing the tax credit, the Act has three more. One man-
4
dates the government to put in place microcredit and training programs to support young
entrepreneurs. Another introduces tax breaks for newly registered small firms, and the last
one eliminates a set of labor, commercial, legal and accounting procedures formal firms
were required to conduct with certain regularity. None of the other Act’s measures con-
found the intended effect of the tax credit. New small firms benefiting from the tax breaks
might delay their response to the credit, but it should not obscure any aggregate effect
since most (around two thirds) formal wage-employees work at firms with more than 50
workers.
Economic incentives to secure formal jobs for new labor market entrants was part of
the campaign promises of the winning political coalition in the 2010 election cycle. The
media reported on the proposal, but presented it in terms of desired outcomes, not specifics.
The latter became known when it reached congress2 in the second half of 2010, and was
subject to changes as it passed through the legislative process. Moreover, the Act’s name
and its actual content have a weak match, therefore it is unlikely anticipatory responses
are of great extent.
A tax reformed passed in late 2012 reduced payroll taxes for firms. For the First Job
Act tax credit rates, it implies they dropped from 11 to 4.5 percentage points starting in
2013. Even though this policy change affected the credit’s generosity, it leaves unaltered
the identifying mechanism this paper exploits, which is the presence of discontinuities in
the effective payroll tax rate across the age and labor earnings distributions.
1.2.2 Conceptual Framework
If labor demand shifts out in response to an incremental employer-side wage subsidy that
targets a certain group of workers (e.g., low earning, or under 28 years old), and labor sup-
ply for this group is not perfectly inelastic, economic theory predicts an increase in em-
2The legislative year starts on July 20, and Presidential inaugurations take place on August 7. The first
draft of the Act reached congress on August 19, 2010, was debated in late November, and signed into law
on December 29, 2010.
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ployment of targeted workers. Workers taking subsidized jobs can come from three places
only: the pool of job seekers and non-participants, the pool of non-targeted workers, and
in an economy with a large informal labor market, the pool of informal workers as well.
The extent to which each of these sources supply workers depends on how substitutable
they are with respect to the targeted group.
To illustrate this idea, consider a simple two sector model. Production in the formal
sector uses unskilled (LU), semiskilled (LS) and skilled workers (LH), with production
function:
Y = F (LU , LS, LH) (1.1)
while in the informal sector production is carried out using unskilled workers only:
X = G(LU) (1.2)
Labor demand depends on the wage:
L∗s,j = Ls,j(w
∗
j ) (1.3)
where s indexes sector, and j skill level.3
For simplicity, assume the supply of all type of labor is fixed: L¯ = LU + LS + LH , with
LU = L
f
U + L
i
U . The government decides to introduce a wage subsidy for formal unskilled
workers. After log-linearizing and totally differentiating (3), the across and within sector
substitution of unskilled workers are:
LˆiU − LˆfU = σ1(wfU − δ − wiU) (1.4)
LˆfS − LˆfU = σ2(wfU − δ − wfS) (1.5)
3Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2012) model firms sector and labor demand decisions. In the model
production is a function of labor and managerial ability. The model predicts sorting; firms with lower
managerial ability become informal. It also predicts informal firms are smaller, and hire unskilled workers.
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LˆfH − LˆfU = σ3(wfU − δ − wfH) (1.6)
where σ1, σ2 and σ3 are the elasticities of substitution between formal unskilled workers,
and informal unskilled, formal semiskilled, and formal skilled workers, respectively. There-
fore, as long as elasticities of substitution are different from zero, movement of workers
across and within sectors result in an increase in the number of formal unskilled workers,
and drops in the number of informal unskilled, formal semiskilled, and formal skilled work-
ers.4
This framework helps in thinking about the effects of the subsidy in a world with a
continuous distribution of skills. To begin with, it is safe to assume substitutability de-
creases the farther apart two given skill levels are. Thus, in the formal sector the number
of targeted workers should increase, drop in skill levels in close proximity to it, and remain
unchanged for skill levels sufficiently high in the distribution. In the informal sector, where
the skills distribution is skewed towards the bottom, overlapping substantially with the
skill range where jobs are subsidized, mass drops should also appear.
The fixed labor supply assumption implies the total number of workers taking subsi-
dized jobs equals the sum of workers displaced from the informal sector and from other
skill levels in the formal sector. Relaxing the assumption implies the equality no longer
holds. This is the case since the shifts in labor demand alter the equilibrium wage, and
with it the size of the pool of labor market participants. Therefore, in addition to the in-
formal sector and other parts of the formal sector skills distribution, workers taking subsi-
dized jobs can come from out of the market.
Taking the predictions to the wage subsidy under study, the density of formal work-
4Defining labor categories in terms of age instead of skill or ability, lead to qualitatively identical
predictions. Let LL and LH denote young (e.g. 18 ≤ age < 35) and mature (e.g. 35 ≤ age < 65)
workers, respectively. Assume all mature workers are equally productive, but within young workers pro-
ductivity varies between unexperienced (e.g. 18 ≤ age < 28, and denoted by LU ) and experienced (e.g.
28 ≤ age < 35, and denoted by LS) workers. Equation (1.4) to (1.6) hold, and a wage subsidy targeting
young, unexperienced workers, increases labor demand for this group, and its share in total employment.
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ers earning between one and one and a half minimum wages, and/or of formal workers
younger than 28 years old must have increased. If the subsidy displaced workers within
the formal sector, mass drops must appear in earnings regions adjacent to the targeted
one, and/or near but to the right of 28 years old. If displacement occurred in the informal
sector, the density must drop around one and one and a half minimum wages and/or be-
low 28 years of age. It can be that the only density change occurs in the earnings and/or
age regions targeted by the subsidy. If this is the case, all extra workers must have came
from outside the market. Before taking these predictions to the data, the next subsection
describes the dataset used to perform the empirical analyses.
1.2.3 Colombia’s Continuous Household Survey
All empirical analyses in this paper use Colombia’s Continuous Household Survey5 for
years 2008 to 2015. It is a nationally representative cross sectional survey conducted by
DANE -which is a Spanish acronym for ‘National Statistics Institute’- designed to monitor
the Colombian labor market. It captures general demographic characteristics, and for all
individuals 10 years old or older, asks a comprehensive set of questions about their labor
market status. Demographic characteristics include gender, age, family composition, and
educational attainment. Working-age individuals who are labor market participants, and
have a job, report monthly earnings, hours of work, tenure, occupation, compliance with
social security regulations, and firm size, among several other characteristics of their cur-
rent job.
To classify workers as formal or informal I use questions about compliance with so-
cial security contributions: formal if comply, informal otherwise. To assess how accurately
it approximates the sizes of the formal and informal labor markets, I check the extent of
mass below the minimum wage in the formal sector and the fraction of formal public sec-
tor workers. Since no formal worker should earn less than the minimum wage, a good ap-
proximation should place very few individuals in that area. It is also reasonable to assume
5In Spanish, Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares.
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the government complies with all labor regulations when acting as employer, thus, if mea-
surement error is not systematic, the vast majority of public sector workers should be clas-
sified as formal. Figures 1.1b and 1.1c show this definition of formality places 95% or more
of public sector workers in the formal sector, and less than 10% of formal workers below
the minimum wage, respectively.
In the Colombian context, month is the reference period commonly used for salaries,
even in the case of low paying jobs. Accordingly, the survey asks for monthly earnings. To
express them in terms of ‘minimum wages’, the unit used in the First Job Act, I rescale
them using the minimum wage series for the years under study.6 The calculation is trans-
parent, since a presidential decree adjusts annually the minimum wage, it covers all indus-
tries, and its nominal value is the same nationwide.
Years 2008 to 2010 serve as pre-policy period, and years 2012 to 2015 as post-policy
period. Changes in the survey’s methodology impede adding more pre-policy years. Nearly
half the workers are formal (figure 1.1a). Consistent with La-Porta and Shleifer (2014)
characterization of the formal and informal labor markets, in the latter, the average worker
is less educated (8.2 years of education versus 12.5 of formal workers), less productive (al-
most 70% earn less than the minimum wage) and works at smaller firms (90% at firms of
5 or less employees, while that fraction among formal workers is 15%). Despite the differ-
ences, figures 1.1e and 1.1f show substantial overlap between the formal and informal labor
earnings and age distributions. Lastly, figures 1.1c and 1.1d show the discontinuous jumps
in the effective payroll tax rate occur in dense parts of the distributions; nearly 50% of for-
mal workers earn between one and two minimum wages, and about 40% are in the 24 to
44 age range.
6The minimum wage series from 1984 to date can be downloaded from: http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/indice-
salarios
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1.3 Empirical Analysis
The first part of this section presents evidence formal firms responded to the policy. It
does so by contrasting formal labor earnings and age distributions before and after the
wage subsidy. Thereafter, I incorporate the informal sector into the analysis, and estimate
the magnitude of the response in terms of net employment growth and change in the size
of the formal sector.
1.3.1 Graphical Evidence
I estimate the empirical distributions using Kernel methods. The estimator uses an Epanech-
nikov kernel function, and a ‘rule-of-thumb’ approach for choosing the optimal bandwidth.
All empirical distributions are based on counts of non-public sector, full time workers.
Figure 1.2a shows that the empirical labor earnings distribution exhibits the expected
changes: i) a mass increase in the targeted region ([MW − 1.5 ∗MW )), and ii) mass drops
to the left ((0.0 − 0.8 ∗MW )) and right ([1.5 ∗MW − 1.9 ∗MW ]) of one, and one and a
half minimum wages, respectively (figure 1.3 zooms in into each of these regions).
On the other hand, figure 1.2b shows formal firms did not respond on the age mar-
gin, a finding consistent with most of the existent evidence about active labor market pro-
grams that target young workers (see Katz (1996), Card et al. (2015), and Kluve (2016)).
Proposed explanations for why labor demand is not responsive for this segment of the la-
bor market include the relatively higher uncertainty employers have about young workers’
skills, and their low levels of job attachment. In the Colombian context, another possible
explanation is that other incentives to hire young workers might compete in generosity
with the wage subsidy. It can be the case of the ‘apprenticeship’ contract. Legislated in
2002, it offers formal firms the option of paying below the minimum wage, plus a payroll
tax discount, for up to two years for every apprentice they retain.7
7Another explanation for why formal employment of workers 28 years old or younger does not increase,
is that labor supply for this segment of the labor market is perfectly inelastic. If this is the case, the shift
in labor demand caused by the wage subsidy increases the equilibrium wage, but leaves employment un-
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The rest of the paper focuses on the labor earnings margin. In terms of response dy-
namics, figure 1.4 shows: i) there is no sign of mass changes before the introduction of the
wage subsidy, ii) emergence of excess mass in the targeted earnings region is not transi-
tory, and iii) appearance of missing mass lags appearance of excess mass. Potential con-
founders are contemporaneuous industry-specific or region-specific policies. Appendix A.2
shows the described changes in the earnings distribution are present across most industries
and regions.
1.3.2 Employment Effects
Workers forming the excess mass in the formal sector labor earnings distribution can only
come from three places: i) other parts of the formal labor earnings distribution, ii) the in-
formal sector, and iii) the pool of job-seekers. Regarding the first source, figues 1.2a and
1.3 show the subsidy caused the displacement of formal workers from earnings ranges adja-
cent to the targeted region.
With respect to displacement of informal workers, theory does not provide a sharp
prediction where they should come from in the distribution. To procure an answer, I ex-
ploit two facts of the informal sector. First, its labor earnings distribution is less dispersed
than its formal sector counterpart, with about 70% of informal workers earning less than
the minimum wage, and over 90% earning less than two minimum wages. Therefore, by
searching for mass changes over the (0.0 − 2.0 ∗MW ] range, I am covering almost the en-
tire informal labor earnings distribution. Second, informal workers are more homogeneous,
in terms of observable characteristics (e.g., age, education, family composition), than for-
mal workers are. An informal worker earning the minimum wage is very much alike an
informal worker earning two minimum wages, which is not true in the formal sector. Since
informal workers are more homogeneous, they could come from below the minimum wage,
but also come from higher parts of the distribution, since some might be willing to trade
changed. Appendix A.1 presents evidence neither employment nor labor earnings changed for the age
group targeted by the subsidy.
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off higher gross earnings for the mandated benefits attached to formal jobs.
Despite the above-mentioned, convenient facts, it remains true there is no theoretical
guidance regarding where in the distribution displaced informal workers should come from,
therefore I cannot tell with certainty which mass changes, if any, were caused by the wage
subsidy. The best I can do then, is a bounding exercise. I will search for mass changes in
the (0.0− 2.0 ∗MW ] range in the informal sector labor earnings distribution, and say that,
if the net number of workers forming these mass changes took subsidized jobs, it repre-
sents an upper bound for the size of the across sector displacement of workers. Figure 1.5
shows missing mass appears in the [0.4 ∗MW − 1.2 ∗MW ] range, and excess mass in the
[1.3∗MW −1.8∗MW ] range of the informal labor earnings distribution, the latter possibly
reflecting across sector movement of workers from the spillover region located to the right
of 1.5 minimum wages in the formal labor earnings distribution.
Lastly, workers coming from the pool of job seekers is the residual after accounting for
displacement of formal and informal workers. Note that since I am estimating an upper
bound for the number of informal workers taking subsidized jobs, the number of jobs that
went to job seekers represents a lower bound.
To fix ideas, denote by ∆1, ∆2, and ∆3, the number of workers coming from the in-
formal sector, other parts of the formal labor earnings distribution, and the pool of job
seekers, respectively. The following expressions define these objects:
∆1 = Minformal[0.4−1.2] (1.7)
∆2 = Mformal(0.0−0.8] +Mformal[1.5−1.9] − Einformal[1.3−1.8] (1.8)
∆3 = Eformal[1.0−1.5) −∆1 −∆2 (1.9)
where E and M denote excess and missing mass, respectively.
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Estimation of mass changes makes use of the following, reduced form specification:
cj,t0 =
P∑
i=0
βi(zj,t0)
i +
zU∑
i=zL
γi1[zj,t0 = i] + vj,t0 (1.10)
where cj,t0 is the number of workers in bin j, zj,t0 the earnings level in bin j, and zL, zU
earnings levels immediately to the left and right of the minimum wage, respectively. The
latter terms intend to reproduce the pronounced spike at the minimum wage. p denotes
the order of the polynomial, and t0 pre-policy years. The counterfactual distribution is
given by:
cˆj,t1 =
p∑
i=0
βˆi(zi,t1)
i +
zU∑
i=zL
γˆi1[zj,t1 = i] (1.11)
where t1 denotes post-policy years. Excess (E) and missing (M) mass areas are measured
as the difference between observed and counterfactual bin counts: Eˆ =
∑
j(cj,t1 − cˆj,t1) and
Mˆ =
∑
j(cˆj,t1 − cj,t1).
Before estimating excess and missing mass areas, I assess whether the reduced form
estimate of the formal and informal labor earnings distributions reproduce the changes
observed when they are estimated using kernel methods. Bins’ length in the reduced form
specification match the optimal bandwidth used in the kernel estimation (j = 0.1 for the
formal sector distribution, and j = 0.2 for the informal sector distribution). The order of
the polynomial that better fits the data is p = 3 for the formal sector distribution, and
p = 4 for the informal sector distribution (table 1.1).
Figures 1.6 and 1.7 show the reduced form estimates replicate all observed changes.
Concretely, in the formal sector distribution, missing mass is in the (0.0 − 0.8 ∗MW ) and
[1.5 ∗MW − 1.9 ∗MW ] ranges, and excess mass in the targeted earnings range [MW −
1.5 ∗MW ). In the informal sector distributions, missing and excess mass are found in the
[0.4 ∗MW − 1.2 ∗MW ] and [1.3 ∗MW − 1.8 ∗MW ] ranges, respectively.
For estimation of all objects (E, M and ∆′s) defined in this section, I resort to a boot-
strapping procedure that uses a 10% random sample and 500 replications. Table 1.2 con-
tains the results. The subsidy added over 700, 000 jobs in the [MW − 1.5 ∗ MW ) labor
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earnings range, a roughly 8% increase with respect to the number of workers that would
had located there absent the subsidy. Workers who absent the wage subsidy would had al-
ready been working in the formal sector took 13.4% of the subsidized jobs. The rest of the
jobs, approximately 85%, were taken by workers who would had been working informally
or searching for jobs. From our bounding exercise, workers who would have been work-
ing in the informal sector took up to 75% of the subsidized jobs, and the remaining 10.8%
would have been workers searching for jobs.
1.3.3 Change in the Size of the Formal Labor Markets
Denote by λj,t the faction of formal workers in bin j, at time t. In the presence of secular
trends in the size of the formal sector, ∆λj = λj,t1 − λj,t0 does not give the causal effect
of the wage subsidy on formality. To account for economy-wide trends and contemporane-
ous shocks, I use as control group a set of earnings bins unaffected by the wage subsidy. It
should necessarily locate above two minimum wages, since, as the previous section shows,
below it are the treated areas. Individuals located too high in the distribution do not serve
as a credible counterfactual either, since they are more likely different in dimensions that
are both unobservable and correlated with the probability of having a formal job. There-
fore, as a control group I use individuals located not too far from the affected areas in the
labor earnings distribution. Concretely, I use individuals earning between three and four
minimum wages.
Consider the following regression specification:
λi,j = α0 + α1Tt + α2Gj + α3(Tt ∗Gj) +Xiδ + µi,j (1.12)
where λi,j takes 1 if worker i, in earnings bin j is formal, 0 otherwise. Tt is a time indi-
cator, Gj a group indicator, Xi a matrix of observable characteristics, and µi,j the error
term. Tt takes 1 for years 2012 to 2015, 0 for years 2008 to 2010. Gj takes 1 if labor earn-
ings falls within bin j, 0 if within the [3.0 ∗MW − 4.0 ∗MW ] range, where j indexes the
earnings ranges affected by the subsidy in the formal sector: (0.0−MW ), [MW−1.5∗MW )
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and [1.5 ∗MW − 1.9 ∗MW ]. The matrix of observable characteristics includes a set of ed-
ucation level indicators, experience, experience squared, marital status indicators, industry
indicators, and a set of job history variables.
The identification assumption for αˆ3, to give the causal effect of the wage subsidy on
the size of the formal sector, is that in its absence, treatment and control groups would
had evolved similarly. I begin showing treated and control earnings levels share common
trends before the introduction of the wage subsidy. Figure 1.8 shows that the fraction
of formal workers, until 2010, gravitated around 0.4 and 0.7 for the treatment and con-
trol groups, respectively. The fraction of formal workers starts increasing steadily for the
treatment group since 2011, the year the wage subsidy became effective, while for the con-
trol group it remains gravitating around 0.7 until 2012. At the end of 2012 a tax reform
dropped the payroll tax rate formal firms pay for workers earning less than 10 minimum
wages. It might explain what seems to be an upward trend in the fraction of formal work-
ers in the control group starting in 2013, and also implies the increase in the treatment
group from 2013 on is partly driven by it. If the drop of the payroll tax rate affects uni-
formly different parts of the labor earnings distribution, the control group accounts for it,
and the identification strategy pursued here gives the causal effect of the wage subsidy on
the size of the formal sector.
Table 1.3 contains raw difference-in-difference estimates. All standard errors are clus-
tered at the state level. Panel A shows the fraction of formal workers in the control group
increases by 2.5 percentage points, while below the minimum wage drops by 0.06 per-
centage points, as a result of a drop in the number of both formal and informal workers.
The difference-in-difference estimate of the change in the size of the formal sector in the
(0.0−MW ) earnings range is −2.6 percentage points.
In the earnings region targeted by the wage subsidy (panel B), the fraction of for-
mal workers increases by 4.9 percentage points as a result of an increase in the number
of formal workers, plus a drop in the number of informal workers around the minimum
wage. There is also an increase in the number of informal workers around 1.5 minimum
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wages, but the net number of informal workers in the entire region drops significantly. The
difference-in-difference estimate of the change in the size of the formal sector in this earn-
ings region is 2.4 percentage points.
In the [1.5 ∗MW − 1.9 ∗MW ] earnings range (panel C) the number of formal workers
decreases, while it increases in the case of informal workers. As a result, the difference-in-
difference estimate of the change in the size of the formal sector in this earnings region is
−1.6 percentage points.
Table 1.4 presents the results adding covariates. It slightly attenuates the magnitude
of the change in the size of the formal sector in the targeted region, and increases it in the
[1.5 ∗MW − 1.9 ∗MW ] earnings region. Below the minimum wage it barely changes the
results. In all cases the difference-in-difference estimates are statistically significant.
Figure 1.9 shows the change in the size of the formal sector is not homogeneous within
the earnings ranges affected by the wage subsidy. Below the minimum wage the effect is
persistently negative up until approximately 0.8 ∗MW . As the mass changes point out, it
is the result of a drop in the number of formal workers in this entire region, and a drop in
the number of informal workers only in the upper end of it.
The drop in the number of informal workers occurs mostly between 0.8 and 1.2 min-
imum wages. It explains why the size of the formal sector starts trending up as it ap-
proaches the minimum wage from the left, and why the greatest change happens around
1.2 minimum wages. In the upper end of the targeted region, the change in the size of the
formal sector starts trending downwards as a result of a relatively small number of addi-
tional formal workers in this area, plus an increase in the number of informal workers. Fi-
nally, in the affected area located above 1.5 minimum wages, the change in the size of the
formal sector is negative as a result of less formal workers and more informal workers.
The results described here are quantitatively similar, and qualitatively the same, if
instead of a linear probability model, I estimate α3 using non-linear probabilistic models,
and if I use alternative control groups (see appendix A.3).
This section has shown the wage subsidy caused a sizable shift of workers across the
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formal and informal labor markets, and to a lesser extent across earnings levels within the
formal sector, but relatively little net employment growth, which suggests the excess bur-
den of the policy must be substantial. The next section derives a deadweight loss formula
to assess the welfare cost of the wage subsidy.
1.4 Welfare Analysis
This section follows Chetty (2009) in deriving a deadweight loss (‘DWL’) formula to as-
sess the welfare cost of a wage subsidy in an economy with a large informal labor market.
Consider an economy with P firms, whose objective is to maximize profits by choosing to
operate formally (s = 1) or informally (s = 0), and the optimal level of labor (and com-
bination of labor types), given the technology at their disposal. Technology is a function
of labor and an exogenous, known, firm-specific productivity parameter (zi) drawn from a
smooth distribution with CDF Hz(x). Firms operating formally are subject to a flat cor-
porate income tax (τc), a flat payroll tax (τd), and can access a wage subsidy by claiming a
tax credit equivalent to 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 of the payroll tax rate for hiring workers of ability type
k ≤ j < K < M . Firms operating informally evade all taxes, but face the risk of detection,
and full confiscation of profits, with probability ρ. The firm’s problem is:
max{L1,..LK ,..LM} Πs,i
=

(1− τc)[pYi − (1 + τd)∑Mj=1wjLj] + δτd∑Kj=1wjLj if s = 1
(1− ρ)[pYi −∑Mj=1wjLj] if s = 0 (1.13)
s.t.
Yi ≤ F (L1, ..LK , ..LM , zi)
L1, ..LK , ..LM ≥ 0
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On the consumer side, there is a heterogeneous population of L =
∑M
j=1 Lj individuals,
where ‘j’ indexes ability type. The individual’s problem is to choose consumption (ci,j),
labor market sector (s), and how much labor to supply (li,j). The individual’s problem is:
max{ci,j ,li,j} ui,j(ci,j, li,j) = ci,j −Ψs(li,j)
s.t. (1.14)
ci,j ≤ wjli,j
ci,j, li,j ≥ 0
where Ψ captures the disutility of work, which might vary across sectors, and wj denotes
wage. Workers choosing to supply labor in the formal sector hold a -formal- job with prob-
ability λj(δ), and with complementary probability 1− λj(δ) spend their time in the second
best alternative (an informal job). The wage subsidy affects the probability of holding a
formal job through its effect on formal sector labor demand. The informal labor market
is frictionless, therefore workers choosing to supply labor in the informal sector hold a job
with probability one.
The market-clearing condition LD(w) = LS(w), with LD(w) = LD(w)s=1 + L
D(w)s=0
and LS(w) = LS(w)s=1 + L
S(w)s=0, closes the model. Product and factor markets are
competitive, and utility and production functions exhibit standard properties: u′ > 0,
u′′ < 0, F ′ > 0, F ′′ < 0. Social welfare in this economy is given by:
W (δ) =
{
M∑
j=1
L∑
i=1
[
max
{
(λj(δ)(wjli,j,s=1 −Ψs=1(li,j,s=1)
+(1− λj(δ))wi,j,s=0));wi,j,s=0
}]}
(1.15)
+
{
max
{
((1− τc)[pF (L, zi)− (1 + τd)wL] + δτd
K∑
j=1
wjLj);
(pF (L, zi)− wL)
}}
− δτd
K∑
j=1
wjLj
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where wi,j,s=0 = (1− ρ)[wjli,j,s=0 −Ψs=0(li,j,s=0)].
Conceptually, the deadweight loss of the wage subsidy is the amount of surplus lost
net of labor costs saved by firms due to the subsidy. The first term in curly brackets is
the consumers’ surplus, which given quasi-linearity in the utility function is money-metric.
The second term in curly brackets is the firms’ surplus. The last term corresponds to rev-
enues collected from firms, in the form of a lump-sum tax, for an amount equal to the sub-
sidy they received. Taking the derivative of (1.15) with respect to δ, and using envelope
conditions, yields the following expression for the deadweight loss of the wage subsidy:
dW
dδ
=
K≤m≤M∑
j=1
L1∑
i=1
[
dλj
dδ
(
wjli,j,s=1 −Ψs=1(li,j,s=1)− wi,j,s=1)
]
(1.16)
−δτd
K∑
j=1
wj
dLj
dδ
To make the formula more tractable, I fully parametrize the utility function. The spec-
ification incorporates labor earnings taxation in the form of a flat payroll tax rate (τc), en-
forceable in the formal sector only. The utility function is:
ui,j =

zi,j(li,j)− τc(li,j)− l
1+ 1α1
i,j
1+ 1
α1
if li,j,s=1 > 0
wi,j if li,j,s=1 = 0
(1.17)
where zi,j = wjli,j denotes pre-tax labor earnings, and wi,j
8 net informal sector labor earn-
ings. An individual that chooses to supply labor in the formal sector decides how many
hours to supply by solving the following problem:
max{li,j}ui,j = wjli,j − τcwjli,j −
l
1+ 1
α1
i,j
1 + 1
α1
(1.18)
from which the optimal number of hours is:
li,j = [(1− τc)wj]α1 (1.19)
8wi,j = (1− ρ)
[
zi,j(li,j)− l
1+ 1
α0
i,j
1+ 1α0
]
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The individual chooses to work in the formal sector if the following condition holds:
[(1− τc)wj]1+α1
1 + α1
≥ wi,j (1.20)
The expected utility of an individual that chooses to supply labor in the formal sector is:
λj(δ)
[
[(1− τc)wj]1+α1
1 + α1
]
+ (1− λj(δ))wi,j (1.21)
Taking the derivative of (1.21) with respect to δ, and plugging the result into (1.16) yields:
dW
dδ
=
K≤m≤M∑
j=1
L1∑
i=1
[
dλj
dδ
[
[(1− τc)wj]1+α1
1 + α1
− wi,j
]]
− δτd
K∑
j=1
wj
dLj
dδ
(1.22)
The marginal excess burden formula is a function of two sufficient statistics: i) the
change in the probability of having a formal job, potentially across the whole ability dis-
tribution, and ii) the change in labor demand induced by the subsidy within the ability
ranges targeted by the policy. Absent the informal sector, the first term collapses, and the
formula resembles closely the expression of the well-known Harbenger triangle, where the
labor demand slope (dLj
dδ
) approximates the triangle’s height, and the size of the subsidy
(δτd) its base. In a segmented labor market, subsidizing wages in one sector might change
the sectors’ relative sizes. Moreover, the sector size changes might not happen exclusively
in the ability levels targeted by the policy, but could affect non-targeted groups depending
on the degree of substitutability among targeted and non-targeted ability levels.
Before computing the deadweight loss of the wage subsidy, I discuss the main assump-
tions made to derive the formula: i) informal labor market is frictionless, and ii) no income
effects. Relaxing the frictionless assumption in the informal labor market adds no compli-
cation, but would not enrich the model in a meaningful way. Firms access the wage sub-
sidy through the tax system, thus its first order effect is on formal firms. Additionally, the
model captures the subsidy’s effect on across sector mobility through λ(δ). Allowing for
income effects leaves the formula unchanged, but will require α1 to be an uncompensated
elasticity. The no income effects assumption is a standard one in the labor supply and per-
sonal income taxation literatures, and attempts to recover the size of it suggest that it is
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rather small (Saez et al. (2012)).
1.4.1 Deadweight Loss Computation
In addition to the sufficient statistics, a set of parameters undistorted by the wage subsidy
enter the formula. They are the elasticity of labor earnings with respect to the payroll tax
rate (α1), the net value of workers outside option (wi), the workers payroll tax rate (τc),
and the size of the wage subsidy relative to the employer payroll tax rate (δτd). I simu-
late the deadweight loss by plugging in the sufficient statistics estimated in the previous
section, and using, for α1, values in the range [0.1 − 0.4], which the literature on personal
income taxation assesses as the most credible ones (Saez et al. (2012)), for wi, values in
the range [0 ∗ wi,j − 0.8 ∗ wi,j], and for τc and δτd, their statutory values, 0.08 and 0.11,
respectively.
Table 1.5 summarizes the results. Not reported in that table is the amount of payroll
tax revenue lost due to the tax credit, which amounts to 25 billion pesos. The calculation
for job seekers assumes they all are looking for formal jobs within the targeted region. Un-
der this assumption, they are the only group experiencing a welfare gain. Were they, ab-
sent the subsidy, searching for informal jobs, or formal jobs in earnings ranges other than
the targeted one, the subsidy will impose a burden on them as well. The deadweight loss
of the wage subsidy ranges from $30 to $1, 787 billion pesos. As a fraction of corporate
income tax revenues, it ranges from 0.1% to 4.0%. In per-capita terms, using the set of
workers affected by the wage subsidy as the reference population, the DWL ranges from
65 thousand (U$30 PPP) to 6 millon pesos (U$2,000 PPP). The largest contributors are
formal workers displaced from the spillover region located next to 1.5 minimum wages, fol-
low by informal workers displaced from around the minimum wage, and the set of formal
workers displaced from below the minimum wage.
Figure 1.10 plots total DWL for different values of α1 and w.
9 The net value of work-
ers outside option (w) makes little difference on the magnitude of the DWL, while it changes
9DWL figures in Figure 1.10 include the amount of payroll tax revenue lost due to the tax credit
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non-linearly with the elasticity of labor earnings.
Implicit in these calculations is the belief the upper bound of the number of subsidized
jobs taken by workers who, absent the subsidy, would had been working informally, is the
most credible estimate for the across sector displacement of workers. To assess the implica-
tions of this belief, assume the mass changes found in the informal sector labor earnings
distribution are orthogonal to the wage subsidy, then approximately 85% of the subsi-
dized jobs were taken by workers who, absent the subsidy, would had been seeking jobs.
Under this assumption, the effectiveness assessment of the wage subsidy changes, job cre-
ation is now significant, but the efficiency assessment would not change. It would attenu-
ate the size of the DWL, but not considering all job seekers were searching for jobs paying
in the earnings range targeted by the policy, the subsidy yields a welfare gain. This is the
case because the job seekers’ gains are not greater than the losses from workers displaced
within the formal sector.
1.5 Discussion
This section intends to shed light into three questions: how does the deadweight loss esti-
mate compare with existing ones in the literature?; Could there be social gains from mov-
ing workers out of the informal sector?; and, Who are they relevant for?
1.5.1 How does the deadweight loss estimate compare with ex-
isting ones in the literature?
Busso et al. (2013) assess the efficiency cost of the Empowerment Zones (EZ) tax credit.10
They find no statistically significant effect of EZ designation on zone amenities, rents in
10EZ is a place based, federal program, intended to boost economic activity in the most disadvantaged
communities in the United States. It offers employment tax credits to firms located in the areas desig-
nated as EZ, and grants for local governments to spend in business assistance, infrastructure and housing
within these areas.
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non-designated neighboring areas, rents within designated areas, or wages of non-resident
EZ workers. They do find a positive effect on the wages of EZ resident workers, and es-
timate the DWL of the tax credit amounts to 6.9 million dollars (corporate income tax
revenues were over 170,000 billion dollars in 2000, the year they use as reference point for
all welfare calculations).
The literature on non-place based wage subsidies is vast, but has restricted its atten-
tion almost exclusively to employment and earnings effects (See Katz (1996) and Card
et al. (2015)). It is common to find references to potentially large DWL, but they are all
speculative. Bell et al. (1999) argues, regarding a wage subsidy targeting individuals be-
tween ages 18 and 24 in the United Kingdom, deadweight losses must be large because
they target a population transition probabilities suggest moves frequently from unemploy-
ment to employment. Researchers have also pointed to potentially large displacement ef-
fects to argue DWL must be large. However, evidence on displacement effects is scarce
and, until recently, not credibly identified (Katz (1996)). Exceptions are Blundell et al.
(2004), Crepon et al. (2013), Gautier et al. (2014) and Martins and e Costa (2014), who
use research designs aimed at identifying displacement effect. They find mixed results, and
none embark on a DWL calculation.
DWL estimates are more common in the literatures on taxation and large social insur-
ance programs such as unemployment insurance. The nature of these government interven-
tions differ from the one studied in this paper, but they help in assessing the magnitude
of the wage subsidy’s DWL. A classical reference is Harberger (1964), who finds the US
income tax generates a DWL of about 1 billon per year, or 2.5% of revenues raised.11
11Other authors that followed Harbeger’s approach were Ballard et al. (1985), Browning (1987) and
Stuart (1984). The results they report vary according to the modeling assumptions they made. Ballard
et al. (1985) assesses the efficiency costs all major US taxes by calibrating a multi-sector, dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium model, finding that a one percent increase in tax revenues generates a loss ranging from
17 to 56 cents. Browning (1987) and Stuart (1984) restrict attention to taxes on labor earnings, but the
former computes DWL from a partial-equilibrium model, and the latter from a general-equilibrium model.
Browning (1987) reports losses ranging from 10 to 300 percent of marginal tax revenues, while Stuart
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Feldstein (1999) argues previous attempts to quantify the marginal excess burden of
the US personal income tax underestimate the true losses, since they ignore responses
on margins other than labor supply. He derives a DWL formula where the only sufficient
statistic needed for welfare analysis is the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the
marginal tax rate, and finds losses amount to approximately 32% of the personal income
tax revenue. Feldstein (1999) bases his calculation on an estimate of the elasticity of tax-
able income with respect to the marginal tax rate of 1.04. This parameter became of great
interest in the taxation literature not only for purposes of efficiency cost evaluation, but
for optimal tax design as well. As such, intense empirical research followed trying to ob-
tain convincing, cleaner estimates of it, with the most credible ones ranging from 0.12 to
0.4 (Saez et al. (2012)). Since the DWL’s size in Feldstein’s formula is proportional to the
elasticity of taxable income, given the newer estimates, its lower bound is close to Har-
berger’s estimate, and its upper bound is around 12% of personal income tax revenues.
Chetty (2008) finds that a 10% increase in Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits
leads to a welfare gain of about 5.9 billion dollars, or approximately 0.05% of GDP, when
the baseline UI replacement rate is near 50%. The author shows increasing UI benefits
produces a gain rather than a loss, since at a 50% replacement rate, the ‘liquidity effect’
explains 60% of the unemployment duration’s increase, while disincentives to search ex-
plains the remaining 40%. The ‘liquidity effect’ is socially desirable since it counteracts
credit and private insurance market failures.12
The DWL caused by the wage subsidy studied in this paper is larger than the DWL of
the EZ tax credit, but smaller than the available DWL estimates of the personal income
tax or unemployment insurance. The former is hardly an informative benchmark since it
applies to narrow geographical areas. The latter, on the other hand, covers larger fractions
of the population. In the case of the policy studied here, it covers the formal sector only,
and within it, those at the margin of increasing payroll must simultaneously have a strictly
(1984) finds losses in the order of 20 to 25 percent of marginal tax revenues.
12Shimer and Werning (2008) provides another DWL estimate of increasing UI benefits. They report a
net welfare gain of approximately 2.4 billion from a 1% increase in benefits level, or about 0.2% of GDP.
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positive corporate income tax liability. Overall, wage subsidy’s DWL does not seem out of
proportion when compared to existing evidence.
1.5.2 Could there be social gains from moving workers out of
the informal sector?
Any market intervention is welfare enhancing if the distortion it intends to correct is at
least as great as the loss it induces. Social gains from formalizing workers can come from
the stop of free riding of government services funded via social security contributions. In
the Colombian context, access to health services is highly subsidized for informal work-
ers and their dependents. Adding them as contributors frees fiscal resources that could be
given more productive uses. Gains can also result from greater productivity and better
health, since working conditions are superior in formal jobs; plus, access to social insur-
ance programs enhances individuals’ ability to deal with adverse shocks.
Contrasting the DWL estimated in the previous section with the social gains of mov-
ing workers out of the informal sector, would tell whether the policy enhanced welfare or
not. Unfortunately, there are not credible estimates of the social benefits of being formal,
and estimating them exceeds the scope of this paper. Alternatively, the DWL can be seen
as a lower bound for what the size of the gains should be for the wage subsidy to take the
labor market to a superior equilibrium.
1.5.3 Who are the results informative for?
The results are for the most part informative for economies with large informal sectors
and limited informational enforcement capacity. The US has experimented with non-place
based, non-industry specific wage subsidies channeled through the tax system in the form
of tax credits; however, advanced economies have more recently chosen the unemployment
insurance system as the mean to implement them. The latter ensures better targeting -
possibly at the expense of otherwise higher take up rates- and therefore overall smaller
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distortions. In developing countries unemployment insurance is rare, and where it exists
has limited coverage. Additionally, if shrinking the size of the informal sector is a policy
goal, targeting workers receiving UI benefits is of little help.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the labor market effects of a wage subsidy introduced in Colombia’s
First Job Act in 2010 by exploiting changes it induced in the labor earnings distribution.
Using cross sectional data from a nationally representative sample of working age individu-
als, I estimate the employment effect net of displaced workers. I find the subsidy caused a
substantial shift of workers across the formal and informal labor markets, to a lesser extent
across earnings levels within the formal sector, but relatively little net employment growth.
This finding contributes to a small but growing literature that has been investigat-
ing the presence and scale of displacement effects in active labor market programs. This
study takes a step forward, and by estimating the subsidy’s deadweight loss, provides a
lower bound for what the benefits of moving workers across labor markets should be for
the wage subsidy to enhance welfare. The deadweight loss of the wage subsidy ranges from
0.1% to 4.0% of corporate tax revenues.
In spite of the fact this analysis shows the subsidy created relatively few extra jobs,
and that former informal workers took most subsidized jobs, extrapolation requires cau-
tion. These results should not serve as the basis for a prediction of what the employment
effects of a large scale wage subsidy, that targets low earnings workers, will be -not even
for the case of economies with large informal labor markets. More variation in dimensions
such as the subsidy’s generosity, eligible population, and means of implementation, among
others, is necessary before trying to generalize the findings.
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Table 1.1: OLS Results, Polynomial Fitted to Reproduce the Pre-Wage Subsidy Empirical
Distribution
VARIABLES Formal Informal
Labor Earnings 568.450*** 739.853***
( 120.331 ) ( 207.366 )
(Labor Earnings)2 −0.260*** −0.544***
(0.057 ) (0.160 )
(Labor Earnings)3 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000 ) (0.000 )
(Labor Earnings)4 0.000***
(0.000 )
Observations 100 50
R-squared 0.858 0.980
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.2: Mass Changes and Decomposition of Excess Mass In the Subsidy’s Targeted
Region
A. Mass Changes
RANGE Statistic Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
Formal Sector
Mˆ(0.0−0.8) 73 092.87 596.77 71 923.19 74 262.55
Eˆ[1.0−1.5) 739 564.50 8817.08 722 283.03 756 845.97
Mˆ[1.5−1.9] 185 665.80 4466.00 176 912.44 194 419.16
Informal Sector
Mˆ[0.4−1.1] 559 749.70 5700.75 548 576.23 570 923.17
Eˆ[1.3−1.8] 159 088.50 2379.10 154 425.46 163 751.54
B. Decomposition of EˆFormal[1.0−1.5)
OBJECT Statistic Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
∆ˆ1 559 564.50 5700.75 548 576.23 570 923.17
∆ˆ2 99 670.17 5035.08 89 801.42 109 538.92
∆ˆ3 80 144.62 11 657.67 57 295.58 102 993.66
Note: All objects were estimated using a bootstrapping procedure with a 10%
random sample (with replacement) of the population, clustered at the State
level, and 500 replications. Standard errors and confidence intervals in panel B
account for the covariances among the terms that form them.
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Table 1.3: Change in the Size of the Formal Sector, Difference-in-Difference Estimator, No
Controls
A. Earnings Range (0.0−MW )
Before After Difference
Treatment Group 0.0749*** 0.0743*** −0.0006
(0.012 9) (0.012 2) (0.004 9)
n=138016 n=264892 n=363115
Control Group 0.7130*** 0.7386*** 0.0255***
(0.019 3) (0.020 6) (0.005 7)
n=138016 n=264892 n=39793
Difference −0.6381*** −0.6642*** −0.0261***
(0.011 7) (0.012 6) (0.005 7)
n=138016 n=264892 n=402908
B. Earnings Range [MW − 1.5 ∗MW )
Before After Difference
Treatment Group 0.6016*** 0.6508*** 0.0492***
(0.028 7) (0.025 6) (0.007 9)
n=156578 n=364423 n=481208
Control Group 0.7130*** 0.7386*** 0.0255***
(0.019 3) (0.020 6) (0.005 7)
n=156578 n=364423 n=39793
Difference −0.1114*** −0.0877*** 0.0237***
(0.013 3) (0.009 4) (0.007 0)
n=156578 n=364423 n=521001
C. Earnings Range [1.5 ∗MW − 1.9 ∗MW ]
Before After Difference
Treatment Group 0.6468*** 0.6566*** 0.0097
(0.027 8) (0.025 3) (0.010 3)
n=43258 n=92873 n=96338
Control Group 0.7130*** 0.7386*** 0.0255***
(0.019 3) (0.020 6) (0.005 7)
n=43258 n=92873 n=39793
Difference −0.0662*** −0.0819*** −0.0157**
(0.010 7) (0.007 1) (0.007 3)
n=43258 n=92873 n=136131
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.4: Change in the Size of the Formal Sector, Difference-in-Difference Estimator,
with Controls
VARIABLES (0.0−MW ) [MW − 1.5 ∗MW ) [1.5 ∗MW − 1.9 ∗MW ]
αˆ3 −0.027*** 0.013* −0.023***
(0.007 ) (0.007 ) (0.008 )
Time Indicator 0.015** 0.010* 0.008
(0.006 ) (0.005 ) (0.006 )
Group Indicator −0.455*** −0.017 0.025**
(0.017 ) (0.014 ) (0.010 )
Male −0.006 −0.067*** −0.011
(0.004 ) (0.015 ) (0.010 )
Married −0.007* −0.018** −0.032***
(0.003 ) (0.007 ) (0.004 )
HS Dropout −0.359*** −0.305*** −0.380***
(0.021 ) (0.015 ) (0.017 )
HS Degree −0.286*** −0.109*** −0.172***
(0.017 ) (0.011 ) (0.016 )
Associate Degree −0.165*** −0.016 −0.020*
(0.011 ) (0.014 ) (0.010 )
Experience 0.001 0.001 −0.006***
(0.001 ) (0.001 ) (0.001 )
Experience2 0.000 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000 ) (0.000 ) (0.000 )
Second Job 0.016*** 0.070*** 0.047***
(0.005 ) (0.004 ) (0.011 )
Not Worked Before 0.043*** 0.145*** 0.131***
(0.007 ) (0.010 ) (0.012 )
Tenure 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000 ) (0.000 ) (0.000 )
Service Sector −0.003 −0.046*** −0.059***
(0.004 ) (0.014 ) (0.016 )
Constant 0.742*** 0.505*** 0.661***
(0.012 ) (0.017 ) (0.021 )
Observations 402,711 520,592 135,979
R-squared 0.390 0.104 0.161
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1.1: Size of the Formal Sector, Fraction of Formal Public Sector Workers, and
Empirical Labor Earnings and Age CDFs and PDFs, 2008-2015
(a) Size of Formal Sector (b) Public Sector Workers
(c) Labor Earnings CDF, 2008-2015 (d) Age CDF, 2008-2015
(e) Labor Earnings PDF, 2008-2015 (f) Age CDF, 2008-2015
Notes: Due to the long right tail, figures 1.1c and 1.1e zoom in in the (0-3*MW) range
of the earnings distribution. Empirical PDFs and CDFs in figures 1.1c to 1.1f use survey
weights. Dashed vertical lines in figures 1.1c to 1.1f denote the earnings and age points
where the effective payroll tax rate jumps beacuse of the introduction of the wage subsidy.
Solid vertial lines arbitrarily delimit a range where both the subsidy applies and does not
apply.
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Figure 1.2: Formal Labor Earnings and Age PDF
(a) Empirical Labor Earnings PDF
(b) Empirical Age PDF
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Figure 1.4: Formal Labor Earnings PDF, by Year
(a)
(b)
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Figure 1.4 (cont.): Formal Labor Earnings PDF, by Year
(c)
(d)
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Figure 1.4 (cont.): Formal Labor Earnings PDF, by Year
(e)
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Figure 1.5: Informal Labor Earnings PDF Before and After the Policy Change
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Figure 1.6: Formal Labor Earnings PDF, Kernel versus Reduced Form Estimates
Kernel Estimator
(a) (0.0-0.8*MW)
Reduced Form Estimation
(b) (0.0-0.8*MW)
(c) [MW-1.5*MW) (d) [MW-1.5*MW)
(e) [1.5*MW-1.9*MW] (f) [1.5*MW-1.9*MW]
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Figure 1.7: Informal Labor Earnings PDF, Kernel versus Reduced Form Estimates
Kernel Estimator
(a) [0.4*MW-1.2*MW]
Reduced Form Estimation
(b) [0.4*MW-1.2*MW]
(c) [1.3*MW-1.8*MW] (d) [1.3*MW-1.8*MW]
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Figure 1.8: Fraction of Formal Workers in Treatment and Control Labor Earnings Regions
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Figure 1.9: Change in the Size of the Formal Sector, By Earnings Bins
42
Figure 1.10: Deadweight Loss Calculation
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Chapter 2
Do Tax Incentives Increase Small
Firms’ Survival Rate?
(with J. Romero)
2.1 Introduction
Creative destruction is a solidly-rooted idea in economics. More creative innovative firms
outperform competitors, making them eventually abandon the market. It implies, absent
any market friction, that firms’ mortalitiy is optimal and survivors are a key force driving
endogenous aggregate output growth (Aghion and Howitt (1992)). However, markets are
not frictionless. Entrepreneurs have limited access to capital, market conditions are uncer-
tain, and existing firms exercise entry deterrence strategies. These, among other factors,
call into question the efficiency of the observed number of market entrants and survivors.
Several government policies reflect this concern. To overcome entrepreneurs’ limited
access to capital, governments create business incubators, insure small businesses’ bank
loans and/or give venture capitalists tax incentives. To prevent monopolistic practices gov-
ernments set up market regulator bodies, and to help small businesses navigate their early
years they offer differentiated tax treatments or tax breaks. Yet, solid evidence about the
impact of these type of policies on firms’ entrance and survival is scarce.1
1Gale and Brown (2013)’s review of the literature of the effects of tax policy on small businesses and
innovation reflects the relatively little attention that creation and survival of small firms has received.
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This paper investigates the effects on entrance and survival of a cohort-based tax breaks
program introduced in Colombia late in 2010. The program offered tax breaks to newly
created, qualified small firms. The tax exemptions were phased out over a five-year period,
and covered corporate income and payroll taxes, as well as the annual business registration
fee. Dynamic models of firms’ entrance and production under mild assumptions predict
that subsidizing firms’ costs, even temporarily, should have a positive impact on entrance
and survival.
Using social security data at the firm level, we first tested whether firms manipulated
the entry decision. We did not find evidence of changes in the patterns of firm creation,
nor that firms created before the introduction of the tax breaks gamed the policy by mov-
ing their payroll to ‘new’ firms. Moreover, we did not find evidence that the introduction
of the tax breaks program increased firm creation. To study the policy’s impact on sur-
vival, we exploited the fact that to qualify, firms must have been created after Decem-
ber 31, 2010. We used duration models to compare the probability of survival, over a five
years period, of firms created soon after the cut-off date, to firms created soon before.
The tax breaks could have also shifted labor demand out, increasing employment and
wages.2 Next, we compared current average employment and per-worker compensation
levels of firms created soon after the cut-off date to firms created soon before. Since we
observed imperfectly who the beneficiary firms were, we did not pursue an estimation of
the local average treatment effect on the compliers (fuzzy regression discontinuity design),
but an average intention to treat effect instead.
We found the availability of the tax break program had no effect on survival, employ-
ment or average per-worker compensation. The benefits take up rate is below 20%, which
we attribute to the strictness of eligibility rules other than day of entry into the market
and size. The relatively small take up rate, combined with the imperfect observability of
2It is a widely held view small firms create most of the jobs. Haltinwanger et al. (2013) confirm it is
partially true. They find that conditioning on age, there is no systematic relationship between firm size
and job growth, but that it is young businesses, which typically start small, where most of the job creation
occurs.
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what firms received the treatment, impeded disentangling whether the absence of effects is
due to a small, near-zero, short-term elasticity of the outcomes under study with respect
to the tax rates, or that the small take up rate makes any intention to treat effect unde-
tectable.
This paper contributes primarily to the literature concerned with how taxes affect
small businesses’ entrance decision (Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994), Bruce (2000), Bruce (2002),
Gentry and Hubbard (2004b), Gentry and Hubbard (2004a), Cullen and Gordon (2007),
Gurley-Calvez and Bruce (2008)) and probability of survival (Bruce (2002), Gurley-Calvez
and Bruce (2008)).3 Most of this literature exploits differential tax treatments across cor-
porate forms, which makes difficult to tell to what extent the estimated effects are reflect-
ing true economic responses rather than avoidance behavior. The variation we use over-
comes this limitation, since it applies to all corporate forms, and depends instead on day
of entrance into the market.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the program, the data used, and
the theoretical framework from which we draw predictions. Section 2.3 describes the iden-
tification strategy and how we implement it empirically. Section 2.4 presents the results.
Finally, sections 2.5 and 2.6 discuss the results and conclude, respectively.
2.2 Institutional Setting, Conceptual Framework and
Data
2.2.1 Formal Sector Regulations and the Tax Breaks Program
All formal firms in Colombia are subject to the following sets of regulations. At the na-
tional level, they must comply with corporate income, wealth, value added and payroll
taxes. At the subnational level, they must comply with municipal sales and property taxes,
3Other authors have looked at employment and investment (Carroll et al. (1998b), Carroll et al.
(1998a), Carroll et al. (2000)), financing (Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994)) and
corporate form (Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1990), Carroll and Joulfaian (1997), Golsbee (2004)).
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and state business registration and vehicle circulation taxes. Additional regulations may
apply depending on industry (e.g. environmental regulation if in mining), location (e.g.
special labor regulations if operating in areas with protected or vulnerable communities
present), or size (e.g. tax or financial regulations if assets exceed certain thresholds).
Law 1429-2010 introduced a set of tax breaks for firms with 50 workers or less and
assets valued at 5,000 minimum wages or less (U$1.2-1.5 million4). The tax breaks con-
sisted of 100% of the Corporate Income (‘CI’) and payroll taxes5 during the firm’s first
two years of existence, 75% in the third year, 50% in the fourth year, and 25% in the fifth
year. From the sixth year on, they had to pay the CI and payroll taxes in full. It also ex-
empted qualified firms of 100% of the business registration fee in their first year of exis-
tence, 50% in the second year, and 25% in the third year. From the fourth year on they
had to pay the annual business registration fee in full. Additionally, beneficiary firms were
not subject to CI tax withholding during the entire phaseout period, and had the possibil-
ity of carrying losses forward for up to five consecutive fiscal years.
In addition to satisfying the employee and asset thresholds, for firms to qualify they
had to be new businesses, registered after the policy was passed -it was signed into law
on December 29, 2010- and before December 31, 2014. The law explicitly excluded newly
registered businesses whose capital and stockholders were the same as firms that existed
before the policy. To qualify there was no requirement other than be a newly registered
business, with 50 workers or less, and assets valued at 5,000 minimum wages or less. Firms
from all industries, and located anywhere in the country could become beneficiaries.6
The law’s original text was introduced in congress late in August, 2010, but it was not
until November when the legislative process began. The relatively short period of time
over which it was discussed and approved suggests there was limited room for anticipatory
4PPP adjusted, using OECD PPP rates.
5The payroll tax exemption applies over 10.5 percentage points (out of 52), or approximately 20% of all
mandatory charges that have payroll as a tax base.
6The phase out period for three southern, remote states (Amazonas, Guain´ıa and Vaupe´s) is ten rather
than five years. Combined, these three states account for 0.3% of the country’s population.
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responses.
2.2.2 Conceptual Framework
The spirit of the tax breaks program (Law 1429-2010) was to incentivize the creation of
formal firms by lowering the cost of regulation temporarily. It was not aimed at amelio-
rating non-competitive practices or limited access to capital, two other barriers often in-
voked by entrepreneurs. Therefore, given the nature of the program, we follow Arkolakis
et al. (2018)’s model of firms’ learning to formulate predictions on a firm’s entrance and
survival.
The Model: Environment and Solution
Consider an economy where time is discrete and denoted by t. Consumers maximize life-
time consumption, are endowed with one unit of labor they supply inelastically, and re-
ceive wage wt in return. Additionally, they own an equal share of all firms.
Monopolistically competitive firms supply each good in the economy. Firms’ objective
is to maximize the sum of discounted expected profits. Firms’ technology is linear in labor,
the only input in production. Firms’ heterogeneity is captured by productivity parameter
zi, which is known by the firm, exogenous, and time-invariant. In every period firms in-
cur a fixed cost of production, measured in terms of units of labor. Demand uncertainty is
captured by at = θ + t, where θ is a time-invariant, unknown parameter that denotes the
firm’s product appeal, and t is a transitory preference shock. Firms do not know at, but
have a prior about its distribution, which they update every period after observing prices.
Firms’ expected per-period profits function is:
Epi(z, b(a, n)) =
(σ − 1)σ−1
σσ
b(a, n)σ
(
ez
w
)σ−1
Y
P 1−σ
− wf (2.1)
where b(a, n) ≡ Eat|a,n(e
at
σ ) is the expected per-period demand shock.
In every period there are J potential entrants, who decide to enter if the sum of ex-
pected discounted profits -given their prior about a0- is greater than or equal to zero:
48
V (z, b, 0) = Epi(z, b) + β(1− δ)Eb′|b,nV (z, b′, 1) ≥ 0 (2.2)
If they enter, they choose how much to produce. Existing firms decide to stay in the mar-
ket if the sum of expected discounted profits -given that their updated estimate of at- is
greater or equal to zero:
V (z, b, n) = Epi(z, b) + β(1− δ)Eb′|b,nV (z, b′, n+ 1) ≥ 0 (2.3)
and if they decide to stay, choose how much to produce.7
Predictions on Firms’ Entrance and Survival
Consider the case if the government subsidizes a fraction ρ of the fixed costs in the first
year, and without lost of generality, assume the economy lasts two periods. A potential
entrant chooses to enter if V (z, b0, 0) ≥ 0. Solving for z:
ez ≥
[
(1− β(1− δ))wf − ρf
M
β(1−δ)(b
σ
0 − b′σ0 )
] 1
σ−1
w (2.4)
where M = (σ−1)
σ−1Y
σσP 1−σ . Taking the natural logarithm of (2.4), and making the relation
hold with equality, yield z1, the minimum productivity level compatible with non-negative
discounted expected profits. Note that absent the subsidy, the minimum productivity level
observed among entrants, z′1, is larger. In other words, the subsidy allows less productive
firms to be profitable. The number of entrant firms with and without the subsidy is given
by:
[1−H(z1)]J > [1−H(z′1)]J (2.5)
where H(z) is the productivity’s CDF.
In period 2, operating firms decide to stay in the market and produce if V (z, b1, 1) ≥
0. Solving for z:
7For a full characterization of the equilibrium see Arkolakis et al. (2018).
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ez ≥
[
wf
Mbσ1
] 1
σ−1
w. (2.6)
Taking the natural logarithm of (2.6), and making the relation hold with equality, yield
z2, the minimum productivity level compatible with non-negative expected profits among
operating firms. The number of surviving firms (firms that choose to operate in period 2)
is:
[1−G(z2)]J = [1− piH(z2)]J (2.7)
where pi = 1
1−H(z1) .
From (2.7) it follows the number of surviving firms is larger when fixed costs are subsi-
dized in period 1:
pi =
1
1−H(z1)
<
1
1−H(z′1)
= pi′ (2.8)
Note that expressions (2.5) and (2.8) hold under much simpler market structures. Only
heterogeneity in productivity is necessary to generate these predictions. We can easily ac-
commodate within this framework, then, ideas other than uncertainty about market condi-
tions, such as small firms’ limited access to capital, as in Carpenter and Petersen (2002).
The primary objective of this paper is to test the predictions derived from expressions
(2.5) and (2.8) by exploiting the variation created by the tax break program described
above. Before explaining the empirical strategy we pursued, the next subsection describes
the dataset used.
2.2.3 Data
The empirical analyses of this paper use social security records at the firm level from the
PILA. The PILA is the electronic platform through which payroll taxes are paid. Before
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the PILA, firms had to file separate forms for each of their payroll tax charges.8 With
the PILA, they file a single form and have the option of paying electronically. We have
monthly data for the 2008-2016 period, but since it was not until 2009 that usage of the
platform became mandatory, we shortened the period to June, 2009 to December, 2016.
The dataset contains monthly firm-level records of the number of employees and the
wage bill’s value. It also contains a flag that indicates whether the firm was a beneficiary
of the tax break program. The only sample restriction was the exclusion of self-employees.
We used a unique firm identifier to construct birth and mortality indicators; the first and
last appearance in the dataset determined birth and mortality, respectively.
There are three main limitations of the dataset. First, by construction we only ob-
serve firms operating in the formal sector. Second, we do not observe any firm character-
istic other than number of employees and the wage bill’s amount. Third, we only know
if firms were benefiting from the payroll tax breaks. From the latter, it follows we might
underestimate the probability of receiving treatment if some firms were claiming the CI
and business registration breaks, but not the payroll tax ones. In the results section we
discuss the implications of this limitation of the data, and how it shaped our econometric
approach.
Table 2.1 shows that over 300,000 formal firms operated at any given time between
2009 and 2015. Of them, three quarters had five or less employees, 15% 6-10, 8% 11-50,
and 2% had more than 50 employees. The number of entering firms ranged from 3,500-
4,000 per year, and the size distribution closely resembled that of all operating firms. The
number of exiting firms was slightly below the entering ones, except in 2015 when it ex-
ceeded the number of newly created firms. Its distribution, on the other hand, was more
skewed towards the bottom, with approximately 95% of exiting firms having 10 or less em-
ployees. Finally, since the introduction of the tax breaks approximately 15% of entering
firms claimed benefits.
8Separate forms were required for the health contribution, the retirement contribution, workers’ com-
pensation and to each of the parafiscales (contributions to the CAJAS, SENA and ICBF).
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2.3 Empirical Strategy
As access to the tax breaks depend on day of entry into the market, the empirical strategy
consists of comparing firms created before and after the introduction of the policy. Since
firm characteristics vary over time -e.g. more recent entrants might make more intensive
use of technology, therefore are more productive, and more likely outperform competitors-
we cannot directly compare firms created before and after the policy. However, we should
expect differences to shrink, the closer the day of entry into the market is to the day the
tax breaks became effective. This feature leads naturally to a regression discontinuity
design (‘RDD’), where we compare firms created just before the introduction of the tax
breaks, to firms created just after.
To identify the effect of the tax breaks on the probability of survival, employment and
average per-worker compensation, we run regressions of the form:
yi = α0 + β0 · 1(ti ≥ 0) +
K∑
k=1
αk · tki +
K∑
k=1
βk · tki · 1(ti ≥ 0) +Xγ + ti (2.9)
where yi is the outcome variable, ti the month of entry into the market of firm i, normal-
ized so that t = 0 at the cut-off line of January, 2011, and X denotes a vector of control
variables that include, either or both, month and firm size fixed effects. Lastly, k denotes
the order of the polynomial.
The parameter of interest is β0. It gives the average effect of the availability of the
tax breaks program on firms’ survival, employment and average per-worker compensation.
Validity of the empirical strategy will depend on the absence of manipulation of firms’ de-
cisions about entry into the market. Therefore we first test for abnormal changes in the
rate of firm creation around the time the program became effective. Furthermore, to assess
the robustness of the RDD results, we include higher order polynomials (k = {1, 2, 3}),
and use local linear regression. Likewise, following best practices, we accompany regres-
sion estimates with plots of the average outcome variables by month of entry, and draw on
them a quadratic fit to the left and right of the cut-off date. If the introduction of the tax
breaks program had an impact on survival, employment and/or average per-worker com-
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pensation, it should be visible graphically, and confirmed by the regression analysis.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Creation of Firms
The rate of firm creation is one of the margins potentially impacted by the policy. How-
ever, it is also one firms could have manipulated. The concern is that firms that were plan-
ning to start operating late in 2010, when aware of tax breaks being discussed in Congress,
decided to postpone their opening. Figure 2.1 shows strong seasonality in firm creation. It
peaks early in the year, and drops significantly towards the end. However, the drop at the
end of 2010, and the jump at the beginning of 2011 do not seem out of order with respect
to other observed years. Figure 2.1 also shows firm creation did not trend up after the in-
troduction of the policy. Moreover, there are no abnormal changes in the rate of firm cre-
ation around December, 2014, the last month when newly created firms could have started
to claim the tax breaks benefits.
We tested separately for discontinuous changes (β0 6= 0) in the number of newly cre-
ated firms right after the policy was put in place (January, 2011) and right before its ex-
piration (December, 2014). Table 2.2 confirms that there are discontinuous changes in nei-
ther case. Around the start of the policy, parameters are statistically significant only when
the polynomial is linear. Around the end of the program, no polynomial order yields sta-
tistically significant estimates. Table 2.3 confirms firm creation did not trend up during
the time the tax breaks program was in place.
The evidence suggests firms did not manipulate the timing of the entry decision when
the tax breaks program was introduced nor when it expired. The absence of a disruption
in the pattern of firm creation around the time the tax breaks became effective, which we
need for the validity of our empirical strategy, might reflect the short time firms had for
anticipation. However, there might be other explanations for the absence of an upward
trend in firm creation during the time the program was in place, and for the dearth of a
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disproportionate increase in firm creation before the benefits expired. The benefit’s take
up rate, at which we look in the next subsection, will shed light into the program’s attrac-
tiveness.
Two other gaming strategies involve firms created before January, 2011. They might
have had an incentive to set up new firms once the tax breaks program was in place, and
move there part of their payroll and new investments. We can partially test if firms en-
gaged in these gaming strategies, by looking at whether the average number of employees,
and new capital investments dropped post introduction of the program. Data on capital
investments come from the Colombia’s Annual Census of Manufacturing Firms.9 The evi-
dence shows, for firms that existed before January, 2011, no change in the average number
of employees on payroll, nor, in the case of manufacturing firms, any change in capital in-
vestments (see Appendix A.4).
2.4.2 Take Up of Benefits
Figure 2.2 shows, for firms created within the first six months the tax breaks were in place,
the take-up of benefits went up from nearly zero to approximately 10-12%, remained at
that level for firms created in the second semester of 2011, and increased progressively to
15% among firms created in 2012.10 The stringent requirements to become eligible, and in
particular, the requirement newly created firms cannot have the same stockholders than
existing ones, should to a large extent explain the relatively low take-up rate. Setting up
controlled firms is a prevalent practice, mostly motivated by tax and commercial consider-
ations.
Note that we might be underestimating the take-up rate if newly created firms claim
the CIT and/or business registration fee benefits, but not the payroll tax ones. If it were
the case, it would result in an upwardly biased estimation of the local average treatment
9It is a census of firms with ten or more employees. We do not use this dataset more extensively be-
cause firms start being followed only when they reach the ten employees threshold, therefore for most
firms the first year they are observed differ from the year of creation.
10The take up rate among 2013 and 2014 entrants remained around 15%.
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effect on the compliers (benefit takers). To see why, recall the take up rate enters in the
denominator of the RDD estimator (Imbens and Lemieux (2008)):
τRDD =
τY
τW
=
limx↓cE[Y |X = x]− limx↑cE[Y |X = x]
limx↓cE[W |X = x]− limx↑cE[W |X = x] (2.10)
where W denotes the treatment indicator.11 Therefore, given the uncertainty about the
potential underestimation of the probability of receiving the treatment (take up rate), we
conduct an intention to treat analysis.12
2.4.3 Survival Analysis
In the survival analysis the dependent variable is the logarithm of the hazard rate (yi =
logλi), which is indicative of the probability of firm i disappearing in period t. The con-
stant will in this case be the baseline hazard (α0 = λ0), or the risk of disappearance for
firms created soon before the introduction of the tax breaks. All other terms are as defined
in equation (2.9). In estimating the Cox proportional hazard model, and plotting the sur-
vival probabilities, we use data on newly created firms from July 2010 to June 2011. All
survival analyses are over a 5 year horizon (right censoring at 60 months).
Figure 2.3 compares the survival probabilities of firms created within three (2.3a) and
six (2.3b) months, around January, 2011. They show that availability of the tax breaks
have no effect on the probability of survival over a 5 year horizon. Regardless of whether
firms entered into the market soon before or after the tax breaks became effective, approx-
imately 15% of newly created firms disappear by month 12th, a quarter by month 30th,
and almost half by month 60th. By firm size at time of birth, those that started with five
or less workers registered the same probability of survival over a 5 year period, regardless
of whether they entered the market soon before or after the introduction of the policy; but
those that started with more than five workers register a slightly higher probability of sur-
vival. The differences, though, for the latter group are either borderline significant, or not
11The RD is a sharp design if |τW |= 1, a fuzzy design if |τW |< 1.
12In RDD terminology, we use a sharp RD design (|τW |= 1).
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statistically significant (see figures 2.4 and 2.5).
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 contain the results from estimating the hazard model. The former
reports on the coefficients, the latter on the hazard ratios. It confirms what the graphic
evidence shows; availability of the tax breaks has no effect on the probability of survival
over a 5 year period. The no-effect result is robust to adding linear, quadratic and cubic
trends. Likewise, adding size-at-birth fixed effects, or interacting size-at-birth with the ex-
posure indicator, does not alter the results.13/14
2.4.4 Other Outcomes: Employment and Average Per-Worker
Compensation
If job creation is sensitive to taxes, and to the cost of regulation more generally, firms cre-
ated after the introduction of tax breaks should on average be larger, and as a result of
that, wages might, due to the outward shift in labor demand, also be higher. We compare
average employment and per-worker compensation for years 2013-2016, by month of en-
try into the market. Figure 2.6 and 2.7 show there is not a sharp increase in employment,
nor in average per-worker compensation, as a result of the introduction of the tax breaks
program, respectively.
Table 2.6 tells a similar story. Panel A shows the employment estimates are not robust
neither to the regression specification nor the estimation method. Parametric estimates
yield statistically significant results when using a linear and cubic polynomial, but with
reversed parameters’ sign. A quadratic polynomial yields a positive, non-statistically sig-
nificant estimate, while local linear regression gives a statistically significant negative ef-
fect. Panel B contains the results for per-worker compensation. In this case, when using
a quadratic polynomial and local linear regression the effect is negative and statistically
significant, whereas when using linear and cubic polynomials, the effect is positive but not
13Tables A.7 and A.8 in Appendix A.4 present results including size-at-birth fixed effects. Results in-
cluding interactions of size-at-birth with the exposure indicator are available upon request.
14Evidence the proportionality assumption is satisfied is also available upon request.
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statistically significant.
The lack of robustness is indicative of the absence of a significant effect on employ-
ment and average per-worker compensation. These results are quantitatively similar and
qualitatively identical whether we use more or fewer years (e.g. years 2012 to 2016 or 2015
to 2016) or when adding size-at-birth fixed effects.15
2.5 Discussion
The main challenge for our identification strategy is a change in the composition of en-
trant firms as a result of the policy. In particular, the tax breaks pulled in a dispropor-
tionate number of low productivity firms. Since there is no reason to believe the policy
distorted the entrance decisions of firms that were sufficiently productive, firms that would
have entered even absent the policy, a clear sign of a massive compositional change would
be a spike in firm creation soon after the introduction of the tax breaks. However, as fig-
ure 2.1 and table 2.2 show, the patterns of firm creation did not change. They did not
change around the time the tax breaks became effective, nor during the time they were
in place, nor soon before they expired.
Using data of manufacturing firms created between 2005 and 2015, from the Colom-
bia’s Annual Census of Manufacturing Firms, we also tested for differences in observable
characteristics. We tested for differences in regional location, energy consumption, total
and net investment, total non-financial assets, value added, number of employees and aver-
age salary. Table A.9 in Appendix A.5 shows firms created after 2010 are not statistically
different in any of the above-mentioned characteristics, but, marginally and in an unex-
pected direction, in value added and average salary.
Lastly, we show in Appendix A.4 that firms created before January, 2011 did not re-
duce the number of workers they had on payroll. Had they done this, it would have raised
15Tables with results including size-at-birth fixed effects, or a larger or shorter set of years, are available
upon request.
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suspicions they gamed the program by setting up new firms, and moving their payroll
there. Even though all this evidence suggests a change in the composition of firms does
not seem to be an issue, we cannot rule out that it might have happened to some extent.
We should be cautious and restate that, the internal validity of the results rest on the as-
sumption we are comparing firms that are very much alike, except that those created since
January, 2011 could benefit from the tax breaks program.
If we believe the approach we pursued is internally valid, why did the availability of
the tax breaks result in a low take up rate, and no effects on survival, employment and
average per-worker compensation? We can only propose possible answers. Beginning with
the low take up rate, the most likely explanation is the strictness of the eligibility rules.
To verify it, we will need to know the identity of stockholders of both new and old firms,
information that is not available. Other possible explanations are firms’ inattention, or
aversion to being scrutinize by the National Tax Authority, but none of them, again, is
verifiable with the data at hand.
Caution is also necessary in interpreting the absence of effects on the probability of
survival, employment and per-worker compensation. It might be reflecting small, near-
zero short-term elasticities of each of these variables with respect to the tax rates, or to
the costs of regulation more generally. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that
the relatively small take up rate makes undetectable any effect on the outcome variables
we studied. Moreover, the availability of the tax breaks program might have impacted
outcomes not studied here, such as output growth or the debt-to-assets ratio, or it may
be that it is the long term not the short term elasticities that matter. Richer data and a
longer time horizon should help disentangle some of these unresolved questions.
Policies aimed at stimulating the creation and growth of small businesses are perma-
nently in the policy agenda of both developed and developing countries. This evaluation of
the Colombia’s 2011 tax breaks program seeks to inform this debate. Yet, before extrap-
olating its conclusions to other countries or contexts, we should give careful consideration
to the program’s characteristics, and the environment in which its introduction happened.
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It was a temporary program, implemented in a highly informal economy, in a period of
robust economic growth. Whether the results found here carry on to the case of a perma-
nent program, or a permanent drop in tax rates for small firms, or to an institutional envi-
ronment where firms’ activities can be monitored more closely, or during a period of slow
growth, will require further research.
Lastly, from an efficiency perspective incentivizing the entrance of firms should render
welfare gains by means of lower prices, greater product variety and/or higher wages (Arko-
lakis et al. (2018)). Even though the program’s efficiency is not the focus of this paper,
our findings provide evidence the wage channel does not seem to be operating in this case.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper studies the impact on entrance, survival, employment and average per-worker
compensation of a cohort-based tax break program introduced in Colombia late in 2010.
The program offered tax breaks to newly created, qualified small firms over a five years
period. Exploiting the fact that, to qualify firms must have been created after December
31, 2010 we compared firms created soon before the cut-off date to firms created soon af-
ter. We found the availability of the tax breaks had no effect on any of the outcomes we
considered.
Programs aimed at stimulating the creation and growth of small firms are permanently
in the policy agenda. They are typically justified as job creation programs. More subtle
efficiency arguments also back them. This paper seeks to inform this policy debate by pro-
viding a well-identified intention to treat estimate of the impact of one of such programs
on entrance, survival, employment and average per-worker compensation. Extrapolation of
the findings of this paper requires caution. The program evaluated here was a temporary
one, implemented in a highly informal economy in a period of robust economic growth.
Whether the results found here carry on to the case of a permanent program, or a per-
manent drop in tax rates for small firms, or to an institutional environment where firms’
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activities can be monitored more closely, or during a period of slow growth will require
further research.
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Figure 2.1: Monthly Average of the Number of Newly Created Firms, 06/2009 to 12/2016
(a) Raw Data
(b) Quadratic Fit
Notes: The dashed vertical lines denote the month/year when the tax breaks became ef-
fective and expired, respectively. Fitted lines in panel 2.1b come from the estimation of a
quadratic polynomial. Each line was estimated separately.
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Figure 2.2: Fraction of Newly Created Firms Claiming Benefits, by Month of Entry
(a) Linear Fit
(b) Quadratic Fit
Notes: The graphs plot local estimates of the fraction of newly created firms claiming ben-
efits. It includes firms newly created between January, 2010 and December, 2012. Take up
of benefits correspond to payroll tax breaks only.
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Figure 2.3: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates, 5 Year Horizon
(a) +/-3 Month Around January, 2011
(b) +/-6 Month Around January, 2011
Notes: Survival time is censored at 60 months. The Kaplan-Meier method estimates the
probability of survival non-parametrically, using an Epanechnikov kernel function and a
fixed bandwidth.
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Figure 2.4: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates, 5 Year Horizon, by Firm Size at Birth, +/-3
Months Around January, 2011
(a) Five or Less Workers
(b) More than Five Workers
Notes: Survival time is censored at 60 months. The Kaplan-Meier method estimates the
probability of survival non-parametrically, using an Epanechnikov kernel function and a
fixed bandwidth. 71
Figure 2.5: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates, 5 Year Horizon, by Firm Size at Birth, +/-6
Months Around January, 2011
(a) Five or Less Workers
(b) More than Five Workers
Notes: Survival time is censored at 60 months. The Kaplan-Meier method estimates the
probability of survival non-parametrically, using an Epanechnikov kernel function and a
fixed bandwidth. 72
Figure 2.6: Average Employment on Years 2013-2016, by Month of Entry
(a) Linear Fit
(b) Quadratic Fit
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Figure 2.7: Average Per-Worker Compensation on Years 2013-2016, by Month of Entry
(a) Linear Fit
(b) Quadratic Fit
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Chapter 3
Does Neighborhood Crime Cause
Kids to Miss School? Evidence from
NYC Daily Absenteeism Microdata
(with A.E. Schwartz)
3.1 Introduction
While mounting evidence documents the impact of neighborhood violence on children’s
performance on standardized tests, less is known about the underlying mechanisms driving
this effect. One leading hypothesis is that exposure to violence increases absenteeism, forc-
ing kids to miss critical instruction and reducing their performance on subsequent stan-
dardized tests. There is, however, little evidence documenting a causal link between neigh-
borhood violence and absenteeism due in part to a dearth of appropriate data. In this
paper we exploit daily absenteeism data for NYC public school children, combined with
detailed, blockface-level crime data, to estimate the impact of exposure to neighborhood
violence on absenteeism. Our results provide credible causal estimates of the impact of
neighborhood violence on absenteeism, contributing both to the ongoing debate about how
neighborhoods affect kids’ outcomes and to the growing literature on the causes of school
absenteeism.
Street violence is one of the channels through which neighborhood conditions impact
individuals. The most direct consequence is a higher likelihood of becoming a victim, but
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it goes far beyond that. Witnessing violence, knowing a victim or seeing others suffer-
ing a loss could lead to different forms of trauma from very young ages (Fitzpatrick and
Boldizar (1993); Osofsky (1995); Osofsky (1999); Fowler et al. (2009)). Restricting outdoor
activities, often a response to neighborhood crime, limits consumption of neighborhood
public goods such as parks or sport facilities and isolates individuals from peers and, activ-
ities that are not only potentially beneficial in themselves but that could also counteract
some of the harm done by exposure to violence.
School outcomes are natural candidates for trauma originated in neighborhood vio-
lence to manifest among children and teenagers. The school is after home the place where
they spend most of their time and learning is a complex process, sensitive to an array of
biology, family and environmental factors. Attention-deficit, irritability, aggressiveness,
anxiety and depression, are all potential manifestations of trauma arising after exposure
to violence, which could dampen the effectiveness of the learning process (Armsworth and
Holaday (1993), Fowler et al. (2009), Sharkey et al. (2012), McCoy et al. (2015)).
Attending school is critical for learning,1, yet is one of the margins parents, kids and
even teachers might respond on due to exposure to neighborhood crime. Parents and kids
might feel safer staying home to minimize exposure to retaliatory violence, or the expe-
rience could induce the child to behave disturbingly, so that parents, teachers, or both,
might consider is better for him and others to stay home for a few days.
No one school day is more important than another is. Except maybe for someone who
is about to perpetrate a crime, it is not possible to anticipate when a crime will occur.
This paper uses the latter fact to identify whether kids miss school days as a result of ex-
posure to a violent crime. Using daily absenteeism, and daily, blockface-level crime data,
we compare absenteeism days immediately after exposure to days immediately before, and
1Goodman (2014) uses variation on winter weather conditions to instrument for school absences and
closures, and finds that an additional school day missed due to snowy conditions drops performance in
Math and English by 0.05 and 0.01 standard deviations respectively, both statistically significant esti-
mates. The author also finds school closures due to severe weather conditions do not harm students’
performance on standardized tests.
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find that exposure to the first violent event increases absenteeism by 0.4 percentage points,
a 5% to 10% increase in average absenteeism. The effect is statistically significant for boys
and girls, all ethnic groups except Asians, from whom is not statistically different from
zero, all grade levels and all types of violent crime. Students exposed repeatedly through-
out the academic year, respond strongly to the second violent event (compared to the first
one), but do not respond to the subsequent ones.
This paper contributes to two literatures. One is the literature concerned with under-
standing whether, and how, neighborhood violence affects student outcomes. The study’s
findings add to it by providing causal evidence that neighborhood violence affects school
outcomes other than test scores, which had been the focus of previous research. The other
is the small but growing literature on the causes of absenteeism, an outcome that, due to
its meaningful implications for students, schools and families, has been increasingly re-
ceiving attention. For children it means less instructional time, therefore poorer academic
achievement, while for schools and parents it poses coordination challenges. When a stu-
dent shows up after missing a day or more of classes, teachers have to find a way to bring
her up to speed with class material, while trying not to slow down the learning process of
those who showed up consistently. For working parents, it costs at least leisure or work
time, in trying to find someone to watch the child.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the existing litera-
ture on how neighborhood crime affect kids’ outcomes, and on the causes of school absen-
teeism, Section 3.3 describes the data used, Section 3.4 describes the empirical strategy
pursued to estimate the causal effect of exposure to neighborhood violence on school ab-
senteeism, Sections 3.5 and 3.6 present and discuss the results, respectively, and Section
3.7 concludes.
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3.2 Literature Review
Good schools, plenty of drug-free open public spaces, abundant offers of recreational facil-
ities, little or no crime, and educated, well-connected, highly motivated neighbors (peers),
are characteristics typically listed in descriptions of ‘good’ neighborhoods. The absence of
these features is believed to adversely impact children’s life trajectories, a belief partially
supported by the latest long-term evaluations of the Moving to Opportunity (‘MTO’) ex-
periment2. Chetty et al. (2016) find that children under 13 years old by the time their
family moved to low-poverty neighborhoods more likely attended college, and in adult-
hood had higher earnings, lived in better neighborhoods, and were less likely single to be
parents.
MTO does not inform about how much each of the channels or mechanisms through
which a good or bad neighborhood might affect children contribute. One such potential
channel or mechanism is crime. Sharkey (2010) and Sharkey et al. (2014) compare math
and English scores of students exposed to a homicide3 in the week before the test day to
students exposed the week after, finding the former group had a poorer performance. This
relatively recent evidence, even though a significant contribution to a literature that had
mostly relied on observational or self-reported perception data, leaves critical questions
unanswered. Standardized tests are intended to assess the accumulated knowledge on a
certain subject, thus exposure to violence soon before the test day is most likely working
through some form of trauma that negatively disturbs performance on the test. More per-
manent effects, or effects on outcomes whose consequences may last longer as might be the
case with absenteeism are not explored yet.
The best teachers, best school practices, best school facilities and largest school bud-
2MTO started in 1994. The experiment randomly selected a sample of families with children living in
public housing, and offered the treatment group housing vouchers valid only if they moved to low-poverty
neighborhoods. Another treatment group received traditional housing vouchers, and the control group
received nothing. For more details see http://www.nber.org/mtopublic/.
3A student was exposed if the homicide happened at the blockface where she lives.
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get are all meaningless unless kids show up for classes consistently. Aligned with the in-
tuitive idea that less instructional time leads to poorer academic achievement is the well
documented negative correlation between absenteeism and test scores (Gottfried (2009);
Gottfried (2010); Gottfried (2013); Gottfried (2014); Gottfried (2015); Gershenson et al.
(2017)). Causality is harder to establish; the cleanest piece of evidence is probably Good-
man (2014), who uses variation in weather conditions to instrument for school absences
and closures, and finds that an additional school day missed due to heavy snow drops per-
formance on Math and English by 0.05 and 0.01 standard deviations, respectively.4
A question that follows naturally is what the causes of absenteeism are. The litera-
ture addressing this question is for the most part qualitative, and points to three type of
factors: the family, the school and the environment (Epstein and Sheldon (2002); Epstein
and Sheldon (2004); Dude and Orpinas (2009)). Among family factors the list typically
includes dysfunctional parental relationships, low valuation of school outcomes, and lack
of resources to reinforce or supplement learning at home. At the school level, violence and
bullying are factors, and at the environmental level neighborhood violence and the avail-
ability of complementary resources such as parks, sport facilities or libraries are included.
Summarizing, neighborhoods seem to matter for kids’ outcomes in the long run, but
a limited understanding of how neighborhood attributes affect daily choices persists. On
the other hand, even though recognized as critical for learning, the study of the causes
of absenteeism is in its infancy. This paper contributes to these two lines of research. It
contributes to the one concerned with understanding how neighborhoods affect student
outcomes by testing whether exposure to community violence causes absenteeism. To the
other, the literature concerned with what induces students to miss school days, it con-
tributes by providing credible causal evidence of one concrete factor, neighborhood vio-
lence.
4Goodman (2014) also finds school closures do not harm students’ performance on standardized tests.
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3.3 Data
To investigate the effect of exposure to neighborhood violence on school absenteeism, we
needed to observe students’ attendance, where they live, and where violent crimes occur.
From the New York City Department of Education (‘DOE’) we obtained daily absenteeism
records, plus information on students’ socioeconomic characteristics and home addresses
for academic year 2009-2010, and from the New York City Policy Department (‘NYPD’)
daily, geocoded crime data for the 2009-2010 period.
3.3.1 Absenteeism
The DOE provides monthly absenteeism files for the universe of public school students. A
student-day entry appears each time a student does not show up for classes. It does not
report the absence motive, nor whether it is excused or unexcused. To complete each stu-
dent’s attendance history, we added school days with no absenteeism records, and marked
them ‘present’ on those days.
We used the official academic calendar5 to flag school breaks, and days when atten-
dance was not mandatory (e.g religious holidays), or not required (e.g. fall and spring one-
day teachers and administrators retreat). We also flagged days when schools closed due
to heavy snow. Lastly, we flagged all September and June school days since there are at-
tendance exceptions on several days in those months. In all empirical analyses we treat
flagged days as non-school days.
Figures 3.2a and 3.2b show two stylized facts about absenteeism. First, it starts at a
low point early in the academic year, trend up during the fall semester, and levels off at
around 9% once students return from the Winter break. Second, absenteeism is higher on
Mondays and Fridays, while typically reaches its lowest point on Wednesdays.
5To download the official NYC school calendar visit: http://schools.nyc.gov/Calendar/Archives
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3.3.2 Crime and Definition of Exposure
We observe when and where every reported crime in NYC happened. Since we will not
rely on students being a victim or witness of a crime, to consider her exposed, we restrict
attention to the more salient forms of crime: homicides and aggravated assaults.6 Com-
bined, they represent 18%-20% of all crime in the city during the years under study.
Even though we can map the latitude and longitude of the crimes to the properties
where students live, such definition of exposure is too restrictive. Violent crimes are dis-
turbing, noticeable events, that typically have also attached substantial police and com-
munication displays. We opt instead to geocode crimes at the block-face level (see Figure
3.1).7 It allows to use a definition of exposure that incorporates students living in close
proximity to the exact location of the crime, not just those living right where it occurred.
A total of 494 homicides and 19, 847 aggravated assaults happened in the course of
academic year 2009-2010. Not all violent events result in exposure, since some occur in
block-faces where no student lives. On the other hand, an event exposes several students
if they live in the same block-face. Therefore, there is not a predefined correspondence be-
tween when and where a violent crime occurs, and how many students become exposed.
3.3.3 Exposure to Neighborhood Violence
To identify exposed students we need to have a common identifier (‘id’) in both the crime
and attendance datasets. Such identifier is the block-face id. We begin geocoding crimes
location to the block-face level. Then, we geocode student home address to the block-face
level, and link it to the absenteeism dataset using the unique student id. Finally, we link
crime and absenteeism datasets using the block-face id, and keep only students exposed to
at least one violent crime.
6Homicides include murder and manslaughter. We will use the term ‘violent crime’ when we add homi-
cides and aggravated assaults. This definition of violent crimes differ from the one used in the FBI Uni-
form Crime Report, which includes forcible rape and robbery.
7A block-face consists of both sides of the street between two intersections.
81
Critical for the identification strategy is variation across time and space in exposure to
homicides and aggravated assaults. Figures 3.2c and 3.2d show the distribution of expo-
sure by month and day-of-the-week, respectively. Exposure is well spread across months,
while is higher on weekends, especially for homicides. Lastly, figures 3.2e and 3.2f show vi-
olent crime is also well spread across the city. High crime areas are not random, though.
Zones of intense criminal activity are mostly on the Brooklyn side, near the Brooklyn-
Queens border, and the Bronx.
The non-random spatial distribution of violent crimes results in sets of exposed and
non-exposed students that are not alike. Exposed students are poorer, by an almost ten
percentage points’ difference, than non-exposed students (see Table 3.1), a reflection of
the fact violent crime is more prevalent in disadvantaged neighborhoods. It reflects also on
the poorer performance of exposed students on standardized math and reading tests, and
on blacks and Hispanics being overrepresented. Not surprisingly, the greater the degree of
exposure, the more disadvantage the population becomes. As we move across columns, the
fraction poor increases, as does the fraction that is black or Hispanic, and the worse the
math and reading scores are.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
The primary econometric exercise we pursue consists of comparing absenteeism days im-
mediately after exposure to a violent crime, to absenteeism days immediately before. Equa-
tion (3.1) outlines the baseline specification:
absenti,t = α0 + α1Posti + θdw + pidc + µi + i,t (3.1)
where absenti,t takes 1 if student i, on school day t, was absent, 0 otherwise, and Posti
takes 1 for calendar days 0 to 14 (after exposure), 0 for days -1 to -14 (before exposure).
θdw and pidc denote a set of day-of-the-week (‘DoW’), and day-of-exposure (‘DoEX’) fixed
effects, intended to account for the weekly patterns of absenteeism, and the potential im-
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balances in the composition of what days we use to compare absenteeism before and after
exposure, respectively.
The identification assumption for α1 to give the average causal effect of exposure to
a violent crime on school absenteeism, is that students cannot anticipate, within a rel-
atively narrow window of time, when a violent crime will occur.8 A potential concern is
that neighborhood choice is a strong predictor of exposure. If students living in high crime
neighborhoods are less attached to schools, our estimate of α1 might be upwardly biased.
The strategy we pursue, though, is well suited to address this concern, because what it
requires for identification is that conditional on violence level, individuals cannot predict
precisely when and where a crime will occur. We remove all students time-invariant unob-
served characteristics by adding student fixed effects (µi).
We restrict the comparison of absenteeism around exposure to two weeks before and
after. We opt for estimating a short-run, acute effect, since the farther apart from the day
of exposure, the more likely underlying trends in absenteeism might bias the results. An
alternative would be to open the window, and add flexibly a variable that measures the
number of days relative to the day of exposure. This approach, equivalent to a parametric
regression discontinuity design, has the disadvantage, in this context, that we run quickly
into an unbalanced sample, because the number of days before and after exposure varies
greatly across students. Our approach to estimate αˆ1 using (3.1), is in fact equivalent
to estimating a regression discontinuity design specification using local linear regression,
given the plus/minus 14 days window is the optimal bandwidth. Optimal bandwidth cal-
culations suggest it ranges from approximately 8 to 21 days, depending on the optimiza-
tion criterion, and the sample used (see Table 3.2).
Over 40% of exposed students live in blockfaces where more than one violent crime
8The assumption is not testable. Standard balance tests on observable characteristics are not informa-
tive, since we are comparing average absenteeism before and after exposure for the same set of individuals.
Searching for a discontinuity in the forcing variable, in this case the number of calendar days relative to
the day of exposure, around the value that determines treatment, is not informative either, since in this
context it is continuous by construction.
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occurred throughout the academic year.9 We adjust (3.1) to accommodate exposure to
multiple events, using the following specification:
absenti,t = α0 +
J∑
j=1
α1,jPosti,j +
J∑
j=1
α2,jWindowi,j + θdw + pidc + µi + i,t (3.2)
where we now use the entire academic year, not only the two weeks before and after the
violent crime. J indexes the crime number, and variables absenti,t, Posti,j, θdw, pidc and
µi are defined as above. As in (3.1), the parameter of interest is α1,j, which is identified
under the assumption students cannot predict within a narrow window of time when the
crime will occur. The new term in the specification, Windowi,j, takes 1 for days -14 to 14,
0 otherwise, and measures average absenteeism in the two weeks before and after exposure,
relative to the rest of the academic year.
One of the questions that raises repeated exposure is how the response to the first vi-
olent crime, interacts with exposure to subsequent events within the academic year. Table
3.3 shows a non-negligible fraction of repeated exposure cases happen within a relatively
short time distance. We slightly modify (3.2) to dig deeper into this question:
absenti,t = α0 +
J∑
j=1
α1,jPosti,j
+
J∑
j=2
α2,jDistancei,j +
J∑
j=2
α3,jPosti,j ∗Distancei,j (3.3)
+
J∑
j=1
α4,jWindowi,j + θdw + pidc + µi + i,t
where Distancei,j measures how far in terms of calendar days two consecutive events are,
and α3,j will tell how the response to an event other than the first changes as the tempo-
ral distance in exposure increases by one day. Notice that Distancei,2 is defined only for
9Of the 345,436 students exposed to at least one violent crime during academic year 2009-10, 188,953
(54.7%) were exposed to one violent event, 81,868 (23.7%) to two, 36,064 (10.4%) to three, and the re-
maining 38,551 (11.2%) to four or more. Restricting attention to the 16,108 students exposed to homi-
cides, 15,593 (96.8%) were exposed to one, and the remaining 515 to two.
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students exposed to at least two violent crimes, Distancei,3 only for students exposed to
at least three violent crimes, and so on. If we estimate (3.3) pooling all exposed students
together, we will be recovering the parameters only for those exposed the greatest number
of times. What we will do instead, is to stratify the sample by number of times exposed,
and run (3.3) separately on each.
We further explore for heterogeneous responses, by interacting the pre-post exposure
indicator in equation (3.1) with gender, race/ethnicity and grade level indicators, as well
as with dummies for when within the week exposure happened.
3.5 Results
We begin presenting results for homicides. They have two characteristics that favor a clean
implementation of our empirical strategy. First, it is the most salient form of violent crime,
therefore the less likely to go unnoticed. Second, there are few cases of repeated exposure.
Subsequently, we replicate the analyses adding aggravated assaults, and present evidence
of the results’ robustness.
All estimates are based on cases of exposure that happened between October 15, 2009
and May 31, 2010, except those that took place two weeks before or after the winter, mid-
winter and spring breaks. The latter exclusion seeks to ensure a balanced number of ab-
senteeism observations before and after exposure for most analyzed students.
3.5.1 Homicides
Since the vast majority, over 96%, of students exposed to homicides were so to only one,
we start showing the effect on absenteeism of exposure to the first homicide. Column I
in table 3.4 contains the result of estimating equation (3.1) without any of the fixed ef-
fects. This raw comparison of average absenteeism in the 14 days after exposure, to the
14 days before, yields a statistically significant estimate of 0.54 percentage points (‘pp’),
a 5% increase with respect to average absenteeism at baseline (14 days before). Column
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II adds DoW fixed effects, which slightly increases the coefficient to 0.56, and column III
adds DoEX fixed effects, which increases it further to 0.65. Column IV contains our pre-
ferred specification, which includes student fixed effects. The within student comparison in
absenteeism increases the coefficient to 0.75, an over 7% increase in average absenteeism.
We then investigate differences by day-of-exposure, gender, race/ethnicity and grade
level. Panel A in table 3.5 shows absenteeism in the two weeks after exposure increases by
1.0 pp, a 10% increase in average absenteeism, if it occurs from Monday to Friday, while
if it happens on Saturdays or Sundays the change is not statistically different from zero.
This result might be reflecting systematic differences in the geography of crime between
weekdays and weekends, and/or differences in the extent and type of family support kids
receive depending when during the week exposure to crime happens.
Boys and girls elicit an equally strong response when exposed to a homicide (panel
B in table 3.5); the increase in absenteeism for boys is 0.75 pp, and for girls 0.74 pp, but
the difference is not statistically different from zero. Among race/ethnic groups (panel C
in table 3.5) the response is strongest for whites, 1.62 pp, follow by Hispanics, 1.04 pp,
and blacks, 0.5 pp. For Asians it is not statistically different from zero. These differences
among race/ethnic groups suggest there is not a clear correlation between the likelihood
of being exposed, and the response’s magnitude. Both Asians and whites are underrep-
resented among exposed students, but for the former the response is not distinguishable
from zero, while for the latter it is the largest. Similarly, blacks and Hispanics are overrep-
resented among exposed students, but the response of the latter groups is twice as large as
the response of the former.
By grade level we observe the largest response among middle school students, for whom
absenteeism increases by 1.5 pp, follow by the 0.7 pp increase of K-5 students. Neither for
special education students, nor for high school students the effect is statistically signifi-
cant. For special education students the coefficient is relatively large, but imprecisely esti-
mated, while for high school students is both small and imprecisely estimated.
Taken together, these results suggest: i) the effect of exposure to a homicide on absen-
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teeism is fairly robust to alternative specifications, ii) average absenteeism increases by 5%
to 8% as a result of exposure to a homicide, iii) the effect is not driven by a single gender,
race/ethnic group or grade level, and iv) the effect of a homicide on absenteeism varies
among race/ethnic groups, grade levels, and depending on whether exposure happens on
weekdays or weekends.
Next, we investigate how students respond to a second homicide (no student was ex-
posed to more than two homicides). First, we estimate separately the response to each
homicide. Columns I and II in table 3.6 compare the response to the first homicide of stu-
dents exposed to one homicide only, and two homicides only, respectively. Note the re-
sponse of students exposed to one homicide only is essentially the same we obtain, when
we estimate the response to the first homicide pooling all students expose to homicides.
On the other hand, the response to the first homicide of students exposed to more than
one, is significantly bigger. However, it is imprecisely estimated and we cannot tell whether
it is different from zero. Column III shows the response to the second homicide. It is sub-
stantially bigger and precisely estimated. In the two weeks after exposure to the second
homicide, absenteeism increases by 4.65 pp.
Stacking all events of exposure in order to estimate the response to the first and sec-
ond homicide in the same regression specification, yields quantitatively similar, and qual-
itatively identical results. Column I in table 3.7 shows, in line with previous findings, ex-
posure to the first homicide increases absenteeism by 0.7 pp. The response to a second
homicide is smaller compared to what we obtain when we estimate the response to each
event separately, but still several orders of magnitude greater than the response to the
first homicide. Exposure to a second homicide increases absenteeism by 3.1 pp. Column
I in table 3.7 also shows absenteeism in the +/- 14 days around exposure, is not differ-
ent, neither for the first homicide nor the second, than absenteeism in the rest of the aca-
demic year. The latter finding is reassuring because a potential concern is that an under-
line trend in absenteeism might confound the results, but what this shows is that absen-
teeism in the vicinity of exposure does not seem to deviate from what it is on average.
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Column II in table 3.7 shows the results of estimating the response to the first and
second homicide in a single regression, but this time adding the interaction of exposure
to the second event with the distance between the first and second homicide. Note these
results correspond to students exposed to two homicides only, because the distance be-
tween events is only defined for them. As before, we find a substantially stronger response
to the second homicide. The interaction of the exposure indicator of the second homicide
with the distance between the two homicides suggest the farther apart the two homicides
are, the smaller the increase in absenteeism. Even though the coefficient of the interac-
tion term is not statistically significant at conventional levels, its magnitude is not trivial.
Compared to the two homicides happening on the same day, the increase in absenteeism is
roughly 16% smaller (-0.04*30/7.3) if the distance between them is 30 days.
These findings about the effect of repeated exposure to homicides on absenteeism,
point to students becoming ‘sensitize’ to neighborhood violence, at least in terms of their
response to the outcome under study in this paper.10 However, we might be concerned the
population exposed to two homicides is different than the rest of the NYC public school
students, and inferences based on them will not be informative for other segments of the
population. To assess whether the results described so far are generalizable to a larger
population, we next add aggravated assaults to our definition of exposure. By adding this
type of violent crime the exposed population grows from less than 1% to over 30% of pub-
lic schools students, and the cases of repeated exposure increase substantially, since over
40% of exposed students live in block-faces where more than one violent crime happened
during the academic year. Adding aggravated assault will also permit to explore whether
the magnitude of the response differs depending on the type of violent crime.
10We borrow the term ‘sensitize’ from the ‘sensitization’ hypothesis proposed in the psychology litera-
ture on adaptation to violence (Ng-Mak et al. (2004), McCart et al. (2007)). This literature also proposes
the ‘desensitization’ hypothesis, and there does not seem to be a consensus on which of the two dominates.
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3.5.2 All Violent Crime
To expedite computations, estimates for all violent crime use a 5% random sample of stu-
dents exposed in academic years 2009-10 or 2010-11. We focus on the response to up to
the third violent crime, since about 90% of exposed students were so to a maximum of
three violent crimes.
Column I in table 3.8 shows that for students exposed to only one violent crime, expo-
sure increases absenteeism by 0.4 pp, an approximately 5% increase in average absenteeism
in the two weeks after exposure compare to the two weeks before (average absenteeism in
the two weeks before exposure for this group is 8.7%). The first thing to notice is that the
response to aggravated assaults is less strong than to homicides,11 a finding consistent with
the fact aggravated assaults typically involve less police display, thus are more likely to go
unnoticed. On the other hand, even if students are aware of their occurrence, they might
be less traumatic.
Columns II to III in table 3.8 show, for students exposed twice, the response to each
event estimated separately. The response to the first violent crime is of a similar mag-
nitude, 0.33 pp, than the response of students exposed once. The response to the sec-
ond violent crime on the other hand, is substantially larger, 1.0 pp. For students exposed
three times (see columns IV to VI), the response is statistically significant for none of the
events. The size of the coefficient for the first event is small and negative, while for the
second and third is around 0.3 pp each, but imprecisely estimated. Note also average ab-
senteeism in the +/- 14 days around exposure to the first event is below the academic year
average, around the second event is not statistically different than the average, and for
the third event is above the average, a pattern consistent with an upward trend in absen-
teeism, since by construction the first exposure tend to cluster on days at the beginning of
the academic year, and exposure to a third violent crime on days towards the end of the
academic year. We look deeper into this issue in the coming section.
11The magnitude of the response is driven by students exposed to aggravated assaults. Excluding stu-
dents exposed to homicides leave the size of the coefficient unchanged.
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Next, we simultaneously estimate the responses to the first, second and third event
for students exposed to at least one violent crime. Column I in table 3.9 shows exposure
to the first violent crime increases absenteeism by 0.2 pp, and exposure to the second by
.35 pp. The effect of exposure to a third event is small and not statistically significant. In
columns II and III we estimate the model for students exposed two and three times only,
respectively. We find the same patterns, but the estimates are in no case statistically sig-
nificant. Furthermore, we interact the post exposure indicators with the distance between
the first and second, and second and third event. An extra day between two violent crimes
has a near zero, not statistically significant effect on absenteeism.
Adding aggravated assaults to the definition of crime used here, attenuates the mag-
nitude of the effect exposure to neighborhood violence has on absenteeism, but it remains
statistically significant. Similar to what we found for homicides alone, the response to ex-
posure to a second violent crime is stronger than to the first, but interestingly, it is not the
case for exposure to a third violent crime, for which we find a zero-effect. We dig deeper
into the latter finding by exploring whether accumulated absences constraint the response
to events of exposure that happen towards the end of the academic year. Concretely, first
exposure tend to happen early in the academic year, whereas the third exposure in the last
months. Since students accumulate absences as the academic year progresses, a greater
risk of truancy might limit their ability to miss school days when exposed late in the aca-
demic year. To test whether this is what might be happening, we restrict attention to
exposure to the first violent crime, and conduct the following two exercises. First, we in-
teract the post exposure indicator with a semester (fall/spring) indicator, and second, we
interact the exposure-times-semester indicator with the fraction of school days missed up
to the day before exposure. If accumulated absences constraint students ability to miss
school, the effect of exposure should be less strong in spring, and conditional on semester,
less strong among students who have missed a higher fraction of school days.
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 show the effect of exposure to a homicide or aggravated assault
has a greater effect when it happens in the fall semester. When exposure occurs in the
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spring semester, the effect is small and not statistically significant. They also show ab-
senteeism increases for students who has missed less than 5% of school days (up to the
day of exposure) regardless of whether it happened in fall or spring, but the effect is small
and not significant for those who have missed near 10% or more school days. It suggest
school institutions and norms interact with the dynamics of exposure to neighborhood
crime. Schools must keep track of student absences, and warn them and their families of
the consequences of not showing up for classes.
3.5.3 Robustness Checks
We perform three robustness checks. First, we do a placebo test in which we assign ex-
posed students random days of exposure. Second, to address concerns of potential un-
accounted time trends, we strengthen our preferred specification by adding month and
calendar-day fixed effects. Lastly, we estimate equation 3.1 using local linear regression:
min
{α0...α3}
n∑
i=1
(
absenti,t − α0 − α1POSTi − α2(Di,t − ci) (3.4)
−α3POSTi · (Di,t − ci)
)2 ·K(h)
where absenti,t and POSTi are defined as above. Di,t and ci denote calendar-day and day
of exposure, respectively, K denotes the kernel function and h the bandwidth. We use a
triangular kernel and the fully data-driven, mean squared error minimizer bandwidth pro-
posed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) for sharp designs (‘IK bandwidth’).
Row 1 in table 3.12 shows the result of the placebo test. Assigning randomly the day
of exposure yields a small, noisy, non-statistically different from zero estimate of the placebo
day of exposure on absenteeism. Row 2 shows replacing semester fixed effects by month
fixed effects barely change the results. Adding calendar-day fixed effects attenuates the re-
sponse’s size, and makes it relatively less precise, but it remains statistically significant at
conventional levels (row 3). Finally, using the IK bandwidth (row 4) does not change the
estimate of the response’s size; it becomes slightly less precise, but remains statistically
91
significant.
3.6 Discussion: Why Do Kids Miss School As a Re-
sult of Exposure to Violent Crimes?
The empirical approach pursued here to identify the causal average effect of exposure to
violent crimes on school absenteeism is silent regarding why students are more likely to
miss school days after getting exposed to a violent crime. We consider two linked chan-
nels to be the most probable causes. One is fear of retaliatory violence. This might be
especially important for students living in neighborhoods with prevalent gang activity.
The other mechanism is the development of a form of trauma. There is abundant evi-
dence documenting the appearance, beginning at very young ages, of different forms of
trauma as a result of exposure to community violence. They manifest in different forms,
from mood changes to physical symptoms, and differ in intensity from one individual to
another (Sharkey et al. (2012), Fowler et al. (2009), McCoy et al. (2015)). What mecha-
nism dominates, or to what extent each explains the effect we are identifying, remains an
open question.
For students living in high crime neighborhoods, exposure to violence might become
frequent. Psychology offers explanations for both greater sensitization and greater desen-
sitization as a result of repeated exposure to violence. In a world with heterogeneous in-
dividuals, some becoming sensitized, some desensitized, interpreting responses to repeated
exposure is not a straightforward exercise. Our results suggest school institutions might
also play a role in constraining students’ capacity to respond on the attendance margin,
which makes it even harder to interpret results from students exposed multiple times. A
more comprehensive study of repeated exposure will require following students across sev-
eral academic years, a task we intend to pursue once appropriate data becomes available.
Finally, extrapolating from the finding that absenteeism is sensitive to severe winter
weather conditions (Goodman (2014)), students living in poor neighborhoods are, in any
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academic year, possibly exposed to many more violent events than to severely bad weather
days. Additionally, absenteeism due to exposure to violent crime is potentially more dam-
aging, since the learning impairing effects of trauma associated with exposure to violence
could still be present after the student returned to classes.
3.7 Conclusions
This paper explores the role neighborhood violence plays on school absenteeism. It ex-
ploits across-space variation in the timing of violent crimes in NYC during academic year
2009-2010, to identify the average effect of exposure to a violent crime on school absen-
teeism. Detailed administrative data on the universe of NYC public school students, in-
cluding their daily absenteeism records and residential address as well as daily blockface
level crime data, allows us to identify students exposed to every single violent crime, and
compare their absenteeism days immediately after the event to the days immediately be-
fore.
Exposure to the first violent crime a student is exposed to during the academic year
increases absenteeism in the two weeks after exposure by 0.4 percentage points, a 5% to
10% increase in average absenteeism. The effect is present across genders, race/ethnic
groups, grade levels, and violent crime types. Students exposed repeatedly throughout the
academic year respond strongly to the second event, regardless of whether it is a homi-
cide or aggravated assault, but do not respond to subsequent ones. We cannot tell with
certainty what the drivers of the dynamics of responses to repeated exposure are, but the
evidence suggests one factor should be being at risk of truancy, which suggests school in-
stitutions play an important role in molding students’ absenteeism behavior.
This study’s results have implications for school outcomes that are sensitive to ab-
senteeism, such as test scores, grade promotion and high school graduation. However, ex-
trapolation requires caution. In a strict sense, our findings do not imply a causal relation-
ship between exposure to community violence and these other outcomes. More research is
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needed to establish, in a causal manner, those links. Likewise, the results are for the most
part informative of students living in high crime neighborhoods.
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Table 3.3: Distance Between Violent Events
A. Violent Crimes
1st to 2nd Event 2nd to 3rd Event 1st to 3rd Event
Range of Days Freq. (%) Freq. (%) Freq. (%)
1-9 Days 7.6 5.7 0.0
10-19 Days 9.1 6.2 1.2
20-29 Days 8.1 9.0 1.2
30-39 Days 7.9 8.5 2.3
40-49 Days 6.3 9.4 3.2
50-59 Days 6.9 7.3 3.5
60-69 Days 5.5 6.3 3.5
70-79 Days 4.8 4.1 3.6
80-89 Days 4.0 5.1 2.7
90-99 Days 3.3 3.0 3.6
100+ Days 36.7 35.4 75.3
B. Homicides Only
1st to 2nd Event
Range of Days Freq. (%)
1-19 Days 10.2 - -
20-39 Days 13.0 - -
40-99 Days 58.0 - -
100+ Days 18.8 - -
Notes: Panel A is estimated using a 5% random sample of students exposed during aca-
demic years 2009-10 and 2010-11. Panel B is estimated using all students exposed to at
least one homicide during academic year 2009-10. No student was exposed to more than
two homicides.
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Table 3.6: Effect of Exposure to a Homicide on Absenteeism, Multiple Exposure, Response
to Each Homicide Estimated Separately, AY 2009-10
Students Exposed to One Students Exposed to Two
Homicides Only Homicides Only
1st Homicide 2nd Homicide
I II III
Post 0.0070*** 0.0182 0.0465**
(0.001 7) (0.011 5) (0.005 6)
DoW Fixed Effects YES YES YES
DoEX Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Student Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Bandwidth 14 Days 14 Days 14 Days
Observations 117,217 2,110 1,290
# of Students 6,058 108 102
R-squared 0.001 0.008 0.013
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Students exposed to any homicide between October 15, 2009 and May 31, 2010.
Homicides at the beginning, during and at the end of multi-day school breaks (thank-
giving, winter, mid-winter and spring breaks) are excluded. Standard errors clustered at
the block-face level. ‘DoW’ and ‘DoEX’ stand for Day-of-the-Week and Day-of-Exposure,
respectively.
100
Table 3.7: Effect of Exposure to a Homicide on Absenteeism, Multiple Exposure, Response
to Each Homicide Estimated in One Regression, AY 2009-10
# of Homicides
At Least One Two Only
I II
1st Event Window, Days -14 to 14 0.0005 −0.0063
(0.004 7) (0.006 8)
1st Event, Days 0 to 14 0.0070*** 0.0186
(0.001 8) (0.009 8)
2nd Event Window, Days -14 to 14 −0.0087 −0.0065
(0.016 6) (0.019 2)
2nd Event, Days 0 to 14 0.0313* 0.0736*
(0.017 3) (0.032 7)
Post 2nd Event*Distance 1st and 2nd
Event
−0.0004
(0.000 3)
DoW Fixed Effects YES YES
DoEX Fixed Effects YES YES
Student Fixed Effects YES YES
Bandwidth 14 Days 14 Days
Observations 1,025,362 15,544
# of Students 6,319 116
R-squared 0.000 0.002
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Students exposed to any homicide between October 15, 2009 and May 31, 2010.
Homicides at the beginning, during and at the end of multi-day school breaks (thank-
giving, winter, mid-winter and spring breaks) are excluded. Standard errors clustered at
the block-face level. ‘DoW’ and ‘DoEX’ stand for Day-of-the-Week and Day-of-Exposure,
respectively.
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Table 3.12: Robustness Checks
Description Statistic Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
Placebo Test −0.0009 (0.0018) -0.0044 0.0026
Month Fixed Effects 0.0062*** (0.0022) 0.0019 0.0105
Calendar-Day Fixed Effects 0.0013* (0.0007) -0.0001 0.0025
I&K Bandwidth Selector 0.0044*** (0.0013) 0.0019 0.0069
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This table reports on α1, the average treatment effect of exposure to a violent crime on
absenteeism. Placebo Test was estimated using a fixed 14 days bandwidth, DoW fixed
and student fixed effects. Rows 2 substitutes the semester fixed effects in equation 3.1
with month fixed effects, and row 3 substitutes both DoW and semester fixed effects in
equation 3.1 with calendar-day fixed effects. The estimate using the IK bandwidth selector
does not add fixed effects. Rows 2 to 4 estimate response to first event of exposure.
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Figure 3.1: Definition of Exposure, Graphical Representation
Notes: Students linging in the shaded parts of adjacent census blocks would be coded as
residing on the same block-face, and exposed to the same incidents of crime (Schwartz et
al. (2016)).
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Figure 3.2: Temporal and Spatial Distribution of Absenteeism, Exposed Students and
Violent Crimes, Academic Year 2009-2010.
(a) By Month (b) By Day-of-the-Week
(c) By Month (d) By Day-of-the-Week
(e) Homicides (f) Violent Crime
Notes: In figures 3.2a and 3.2b ‘exposed students’ correspond to exposure to at least one
homicide. In figure 3.2c and 3.2d counts of exposure are based on events, not students.
Therefore, students exposed multiple times are counted every time they are exposed. Fig-
ures 3.2e and 3.2f show the count of homicides and violent crimes from the first to the last
day of school. Violent crimes include homicides and aggravated assaults.
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Appendices
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A.1 Firms Response on the Age Margin
An explanation for why formal employment of workers 28 years old or younger does not
increase, is that labor supply for this segment of the labor market is perfectly inelastic. If
this is the case, the shift in labor demand caused by the wage subsidy increases the equi-
librium wage, but leaves employment unchanged. I use a difference-in-difference strategy
to test whether monthly earnings of workers younger than 28 years old increase. I use the
following regression specification:
yi = α0 + α1Tt + α2Gi + α3(Tt ∗Gi) +Xiδ + µi (A.1)
where yi,j is the outcome variable, Tt a time indicator, Gi a group indicator, Xi a matrix
of observable characteristics, and µi,j the error term. In addition to monthly earnings (ex-
pressed in terms of number of minimum wages), I test two additional outcome variables: a
binary variable that takes 1 if workers i has a formal job, 0 otherwise, and weekly hours of
work. Tt takes 1 for years 2012 to 2015, 0 for years 2008 to 2010. Gi takes 1 if worker i is
between 24 and 28 years old, 0 if is between 32 and 40. The matrix of observable charac-
teristics include a set of education level indicators, experience, experience squared, marital
status indicators, industry indicators, and a set of job history variables.
The identifying assumption for αˆ3 to give the causal effect of the wage subsidy on the
outcome of interest, is that in its absence treatment and control groups would had evolved
similarly. Tables A.1 contains the results. Columns I and II show results for formal em-
ployment, III and IV for monthly labor earnings, and V and VI for weekly hours of work.
For all outcomes the difference-in-difference estimate of the average effect of the wage sub-
sidy is not statistically different from zero. Table A.2 presents the results when the treat-
ment group are workers between 29 and 31 years of age, the age range more likely affected
if the wage subsidy cause displacement of workers. None of the outcomes show a statisti-
cally significant change for this alternative treatment group.
The absence of changes in both formal employment and monthly earnings suggest
113
firms did not respond on the age margin. These findings reinforce the hypothesis the wage
subsidy is not attractive for this segment of the labor force, since other incentives, such as
the ‘apprenticeship’ contract, compete in generosity with it.
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A.2 Formal Labor Earnings Distribution by Industry
and Region
Empirical densities are estimated as in section 1.3, using an Epanechnikov kernel function,
and a ‘rule-of-thumb’ approach for choosing the optimal bandwidth. All empirical distri-
butions are based on counts of non-public sector, full time workers.
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Figure A.1: Formal Labor Earnings PDF, by Industry
(a) Manufacturing
(b) Service
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Figure A.1 (cont.): Formal Labor Earnings PDF, by Industry
(c) Commerce
(d) Agriculture and Mining
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Figure A.1 (cont.): Formal Labor Earnings PDF, by Industry
(e) Construction
120
Figure A.2: Formal Labor Earnings PDF, by Region
(a) North
(b) Centre
121
Figure A.2 (cont.): Formal Labor Earnings PDF, by Region
(c) East
(d) West
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A.3 Robustness Checks
Table A.3 contains the results of estimating regression equation (1.12) using as control
group individuals earning between two and four minimum wages. Table A.4 shows the av-
erage marginal effect resulting from estimating regression equation (1.12) with a probit
model.
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Table A.3: Change in the Size of the Formal Sector, Difference-in-Difference Estimator,
Alternative Control Group, with Controls
VARIABLES (0.0−MW ) [MW − 1.5 ∗MW ) [1.5 ∗MW − 1.9 ∗MW ]
αˆ3 −0.035*** 0.018** −0.027***
(0.005 ) (0.009 ) (0.009 )
Time Indicator 0.020*** 0.014*** 0.012**
(0.006 ) (0.005 ) (0.005 )
Group Indicator −0.479*** −0.020* 0.008
(0.015 ) (0.010 ) (0.006 )
Male −0.016*** −0.076*** −0.020**
(0.004 ) (0.013 ) (0.007 )
Married −0.012*** −0.013* −0.029***
(0.004 ) (0.007 ) (0.003 )
HS Dropout −0.341*** −0.276*** −0.376***
(0.014 ) (0.017 ) (0.018 )
HS Degree −0.252*** −0.112*** −0.165***
(0.013 ) (0.014 ) (0.013 )
Associate Degree −0.084*** −0.023* −0.009
(0.011 ) (0.012 ) (0.006 )
Experience −0.001 −0.003*** −0.006***
(0.001 ) (0.001 ) (0.001 )
Experience2 0.000** 0.000 0.000**
(0.000 ) (0.000 ) (0.000 )
Second Job 0.020*** 0.063*** 0.048***
(0.005 ) (0.004 ) (0.005 )
Not Worked Before 0.054*** 0.161*** 0.123***
(0.007 ) (0.011 ) (0.010 )
Tenure 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000 ) (0.000 ) (0.000 )
Service Sector −0.019*** −0.058*** −0.066***
(0.005 ) (0.013 ) (0.017 )
Constant 0.759*** 0.549*** 0.693***
(0.013 ) (0.017 ) (0.014 )
Observations 486,211 604,092 219,479
R-squared 0.500 0.111 0.169
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.4: Average Marginal Effect of the Wage Subsidy on the Size of the Formal Sector,
Difference-in-Difference Estimator, with Controls
LABOR EARNINGS dy
dx
RANGE
(0.0−MW ) −0.016***
(0.004 )
[MW − 1.5 ∗MW ) 0.017**
(0.008 )
[1.5 ∗MW − 1.9 ∗MW ) −0.018***
(0.004 )
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A.4 Other Gaming Strategies and Robustness Checks
Firms created before January, 2011 might have had an incentive to set up new firms once
the tax breaks program was in place, and move part of their payroll and new investments
there. We can partially test if firms engage in these gaming strategies by looking at whether
the average number of employees and new capital investments drop after introduction of
the program. To test it we used monthly employment data from social security records,
and yearly new capital investment data from the Annual Census of Manufacturing Firms.
Figure A.3 shows there are no discontinuous changes in average number of workers
or new capital investments right after the introduction of the tax breaks. Furthermore, it
shows there are no trend changes during the period the tax breaks were in place. Regres-
sion estimates confirm the graphical evidence. Tables A.5 and A.6 show the results of es-
timating equation 2.9 using, for firms created before 2011, the number of workers and new
capital investment amount as outcome variables. This confirms that, for firms that existed
before January, 2011, there is no change in the average number of employees on payroll
nor, in the case of manufacturing firms, any change in capital investments.
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Table A.6: New Capital Investments, Manufacturing Firms Created Before 2011
β0 Linear Quadratic
Total −82.59 −424.2
( 171.2) ( 632.6)
Land 18.30 55.13
(18.57) (55.80)
Property −51.15 56.23
(54.56) (93.57)
Machinery −109.50 −455.9
( 162.4) ( 552.2)
Technology 33.19 −24.28
(27.36) (28.42)
Offices 26.45 −29.77
(18.28) (19.72)
Transport 0.07 −25.52
(19.54) (24.51)
# of Observations 101,200 101,200
Firm FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Estimates obtained from yearly data on new capital investments of manufacturing
firms for the 2004 to 2014 period. The source of the data is the Colombia’s Annual Census
of Manufacturing Firms.
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Figure A.3: Average Employment and Average New Capital Investments, Firms Created
Before 2011
(a) Employment
(b) New Capital Investments
Notes: Figure A.3a uses monthly data from social security records from January, 2010 to
December 2016. Figure A.3b uses yearly data on new capital investments of manufacturing
firms from 2004 to 2014. 129
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A.5 Testing Differences in Observable Characteristics
Among Manufacturing Firms
Differences in observable characteristics among manufacturing firms were tested using the
following regression specification:
yi,t = β0 + β1treatmenti + ei,t
where treatmenti takes 1 if the firm was created between 2011 and 2015, 0 if created be-
tween 2005 and 2010. As outcome variables we use: regional location, energy consumption,
total and net investment, total non-financial assets, value added, number of employees
and average salary. The data comes from the Colombia’s Annual Census of Manufactur-
ing Firms, which is a census of manufacturing firms with 10 or more employees. Table A.9
reports the βˆ1’s and its corresponding standard errors.
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